Hanno's blog

I recently needed to create a random password in a piece of JavaScript code. It was surprisingly difficult to find instructions and good examples of how to do that. Almost every result that Google, StackOverflow, or, for that matter, ChatGPT, turned up was flawed in one way or another.

Let's look at a few examples and learn how to create an actually secure password generation function. Our goal is to create a password from a defined set of characters with a fixed length. The password should be generated from a secure source of randomness, and it should have a uniform distribution, meaning every character should appear with the same likelihood. While the examples are JavaScript code, the principles can be used in any programming language.

One of the first examples to show up in Google is a blog post on the webpage dev.to. Here is the relevant part of the code:

/* Example with weak random number generator, DO NOT USE */
 var chars = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz!@#$%^&*()ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
 var passwordLength = 12;
 var password = "";
 for (var i = 0; i <= passwordLength; i++) {
   var randomNumber = Math.floor(Math.random() * chars.length);
   password += chars.substring(randomNumber, randomNumber +1);
  }

In this example, the source of randomness is the function Math.random(). It generates a random number between 0 and 1. The documentation of Math.random() in MDN says:

Math.random() does not provide cryptographically secure random numbers. Do not use them for anything related to security. Use the Web Crypto API instead, and more precisely, the window.crypto.getRandomValues() method.

This is pretty clear: We should not use Math.random() for security purposes, as it gives us no guarantees about the security of its output. This is not a merely theoretical concern: here is an example where someone used Math.random() to generate tokens and ended up seeing duplicate tokens in real-world use.

MDN tells us to use the getRandomValues() function of the Web Crypto API, which generates cryptographically strong random numbers.

We can make a more general statement here: Whenever we need randomness for security purposes, we should use a cryptographically secure random number generator. Even in non-security contexts, using secure random sources usually has no downsides. Theoretically, cryptographically strong random number generators can be slower, but unless you generate Gigabytes of random numbers, this is irrelevant. (I am not going to expand on how exactly cryptographically strong random number generators work, as this is something that should be done by the operating system. You can find a good introduction here.)

All modern operating systems have built-in functionality for this. Unfortunately, for historical reasons, in many programming languages, there are simple and more widely used random number generation functions that many people use, and APIs for secure random numbers often come with extra obstacles and may not always be available. However, in the case of Javascript, crypto.getRandomValues() has been available in all major browsers for over a decade.

After establishing that we should not use Math.random(), we may check whether searching specifically for that gives us a better answer. When we search for "Javascript random password without Math.Random()", the first result that shows up is titled "Never use Math.random() to create passwords in JavaScript". That sounds like a good start. Unfortunately, it makes another mistake. Here is the code it recommends:

/* Example with floating point rounding bias, DO NOT USE */
function generatePassword(length = 16)
{
    let generatedPassword = "";

    const validChars = "0123456789" +
        "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" +
        "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" +
        ",.-{}+!\"#$%/()=?";

    for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        let randomNumber = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint32Array(1))[0];
        randomNumber = randomNumber / 0x100000000;
        randomNumber = Math.floor(randomNumber * validChars.length);

        generatedPassword += validChars[randomNumber];
    }

    return generatedPassword;
}

This generates a random 32-bit unsigned integer with crypto.getRandomValues(), which is good. It divides that by the hexadecimal value 0x100000000, which is the upper bound of the possible values in a 32-bit unsigned integer. In other words, it is converting to a float between 0 and 1, likely trying to emulate what Math.random() provides.

The problem with this approach is that it uses floating-point numbers. It is generally a good idea to avoid floats in security and particularly cryptographic applications whenever possible. Floats introduce rounding errors, and due to the way they are stored, it is practically almost impossible to generate a uniform distribution. (See also this explanation in a StackExchange comment.)

Therefore, while this implementation is better than the first and probably "good enough" for random passwords, it is not ideal. It does not give us the best security we can have with a certain length and character choice of a password.

Another way of mapping a random integer number to an index for our list of characters is to use a random value modulo the size of our character class. Here is an example from a StackOverflow comment:

/* Example with modulo bias, DO NOT USE */
var generatePassword = (
  length = 20,
  characters = '0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz~!@-#$'
) =>
  Array.from(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint32Array(length)))
    .map((x) => characters[x % characters.length])
    .join('')

This is also not ideal. It introduces a modulo bias.

The modulo bias in this example is quite small, so let's look at a different example. Assume we use letters and numbers (a-z, A-Z, 0-9, 62 characters total) and take a single byte (256 different values, 0-255) r from the random number generator. If we use the modulus r % 62, some characters are more likely to appear than others. The reason is that 256 is not a multiple of 62, so it is impossible to map our byte to this list of characters with a uniform distribution.

In our example, the lowercase "a" would be mapped to five values (0, 62, 124, 186, 248). The uppercase "A" would be mapped to only four values (26, 88, 150, 212). Some values have a higher probability than others.

(For more detailed explanations of a modulo bias, check this post by Yolan Romailler from Kudelski Security and this post from Sebastian Pipping.)

One way to avoid a modulo bias is to use rejection sampling. The idea is that you throw away the values that cause higher probabilities. In our example above, 248 and higher values cause the modulo bias, so if we generate such a value, we repeat the process. A piece of code to generate a single random character could look like this:

const pwchars = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
const limit = 256 - (256 % pwchars.length);
do {
  randval = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(1))[0];
} while (randval >= limit);

Values equal or above limit get thrown away. The limit is set to the number of possible values in a byte modulo the number of different characters we want to use. We generate a random byte, and if it is above the limit, we will just repeat that process until we get a suitable value.

An alternative to rejection sampling is to make the modulo bias so small that it does not matter (by using a very large random value).

However, I find rejection sampling to be a much cleaner solution. If you argue that the modulo bias is so small that it does not matter, you must carefully analyze whether this is true. For a password, a small modulo bias may be okay. For cryptographic applications, things can be different. Rejection sampling avoids the modulo bias completely. Therefore, it is always a safe choice.

There are two things you might wonder about this approach. One is that it introduces a timing difference. In cases where the random number generator turns up multiple numbers in a row that are thrown away, the code runs a bit longer.

Timing differences can be a problem in security code, but this one is not. It does not reveal any information about the password because it is only influenced by values we throw away. Even if an attacker were able to measure the exact timing of our password generation, it would not give him any useful information. (This argument is however only true for a cryptographically secure random number generator. It assumes that the ignored random values do not reveal any information about the random number generator's internal state.)

Another issue with this approach is that it is not guaranteed to finish in any given time. Theoretically, the random number generator could produce numbers above our limit so often that the function stalls. However, the probability of that happening quickly becomes so low that it is irrelevant. Such code is generally so fast that even multiple rounds of rejection would not cause a noticeable delay.

To summarize: If we want to write a secure, random password generation function, we should consider three things: We should use a secure random number generation function. We should avoid floating point numbers. And we should avoid a modulo bias.

Taking this all together, here is a Javascript function that generates a 15-character password, composed of ASCII letters and numbers:

function simplesecpw() {
  const pwlen = 15;
  const pwchars = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
  const limit = 256 - (256 % pwchars.length);

  let passwd = "";
  let randval;
  for (let i = 0; i < pwlen; i++) {
    do {
      randval = window.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(1))[0];
    } while (randval >= limit);
    passwd += pwchars[randval % pwchars.length];
  }
  return passwd;
}

We first define our length and string of possible characters. We calculate the limit for the modulo bias. We run a for loop 15 times. Inside that loop, we have a while loop generating a random byte and implementing rejection sampling. Finally, we use the generated random value modulo the number of possible characters as our index. Overall, this is just 15 lines of code, and it is not particularly complicated.

If you want to use that code, feel free to do so. I have published it - and a slightly more configurable version that allows optionally setting the length and the set of characters - under a very permissive license (0BSD license).

An online demo generating a password with this code can be found at https://password.hboeck.de/. All code is available on GitHub.

Image Source: SVG Repo, CC0

In discussions around the PGP ecosystem one thing I often hear is that while PGP has its problems, it's an important tool for package signatures in Linux distributions. I therefore want to highlight a few issues I came across in this context that are rooted in problems in the larger PGP ecosystem.

Let's look at an example of the use of PGP signatures for deb packages, the Ubuntu Linux installation instructions for HHVM. HHVM is an implementation of the HACK programming language and developed by Facebook. I'm just using HHVM as an example here, as it nicely illustrates two attacks I want to talk about, but you'll find plenty of similar installation instructions for other software packages. I have reported these issues to Facebook, but they decided not to change anything.

The instructions for Ubuntu (and very similarly for Debian) recommend that users execute these commands in order to install HHVM from the repository of its developers:



The crucial part here is the line starting with apt-key. It fetches the key that is used to sign the repository from the Ubuntu key server, which itself is part of the PGP keyserver network.

Attack 1: Flooding Key with Signatures

The first possible attack is actually quite simple: One can make the signature key offered here unusable by appending many signatures.

A key concept of the PGP keyservers is that they operate append-only. New data gets added, but never removed. PGP keys can sign other keys and these signatures can also be uploaded to the keyservers and get added to a key. Crucially the owner of a key has no influence on this.

This means everyone can grow the size of a key by simply adding many signatures to it. Lately this has happened to a number of keys, see the blog posts by Daniel Kahn Gillmor and Robert Hansen, two members of the PGP community who have personally been affected by this. The effect of this is that when GnuPG tries to import such a key it becomes excessively slow and at some point will simply not work any more.

For the above installation instructions this means anyone can make them unusable by attacking the referenced release key. In my tests I was still able to import one of the attacked keys with apt-key after several minutes, but these keys "only" have a few ten thousand signatures, growing them to a few megabytes size. There's no reason an attacker couldn't use millions of signatures and grow single keys to gigabytes.

Attack 2: Rogue packages with a colliding Key Id

The installation instructions reference the key as 0xB4112585D386EB94, which is a 64 bit hexadecimal key id.

Key ids are a central concept in the PGP ecosystem. The key id is a truncated SHA1 hash of the public key. It's possible to either use the last 32 bit, 64 bit or the full 160 bit of the hash.

It's been pointed out in the past that short key ids allow colliding key ids. This means an attacker can generate a different key with the same key id where he owns the private key simply by bruteforcing the id. In 2014 Richard Klafter and Eric Swanson showed with the Evil32 attack how to create colliding key ids for all keys in the so-called strong set (meaning all keys that are connected with most other keys in the web of trust). Later someone unknown uploaded these keys to the key servers causing quite some confusion.

It should be noted that the issue of colliding key ids was known and discussed in the community way earlier, see for example this discussion from 2002.

The practical attacks targeted 32 bit key ids, but the same attack works against 64 bit key ids, too, it just costs more. I contacted the authors of the Evil32 attack and Eric Swanson estimated in a back of the envelope calculation that it would cost roughly $ 120.000 to perform such an attack with GPUs on cloud providers. This is expensive, but within the possibilities of powerful attackers. Though one can also find similar installation instructions using a 32 bit key id, where the attack is really cheap.

Going back to the installation instructions from above we can imagine the following attack: A man in the middle network attacker can intercept the connection to the keyserver - it's not encrypted or authenticated - and provide the victim a colliding key. Afterwards the key is imported by the victim, so the attacker can provide repositories with packages signed by his key, ultimately leading to code execution.

You may notice that there's a problem with this attack: The repository provided by HHVM is using HTTPS. Thus the attacker can not simply provide a rogue HHVM repository. However the attack still works.

The imported PGP key is not bound to any specific repository. Thus if the victim has any non-HTTPS repository configured in his system the attacker can provide a rogue repository on the next call of "apt update". Notably by default both Debian and Ubuntu use HTTP for their repositories (a Debian developer even runs a dedicated web page explaining why this is no big deal).

Attack 3: Key over HTTP

Issues with package keys aren't confined to Debian/APT-based distributions. I found these installation instructions at Dropbox (Link to Wayback Machine, as Dropbox has changed them after I reported this):



It should be obvious what the issue here is: Both the key and the repository are fetched over HTTP, a network attacker can simply provide his own key and repository.

Discussion

The standard answer you often get when you point out security problems with PGP-based systems is: "It's not PGP/GnuPG, people are just using it wrong". But I believe these issues show some deeper problems with the PGP ecosystem. The key flooding issue is inherited from the systemically flawed concept of the append only key servers.

The other issue here is lack of deprecation. Short key ids are problematic, it's been known for a long time and there have been plenty of calls to get rid of them. This begs the question why no effort has been made to deprecate support for them. One could have said at some point: Future versions of GnuPG will show a warning for short key ids and in three years we will stop supporting them.

This reminds of other issues like unauthenticated encryption, where people have been arguing that this was fixed back in 1999 by the introduction of the MDC. Yet in 2018 it was still exploitable, because the unauthenticated version was never properly deprecated.

Fix

For all people having installation instructions for external repositories my recommendation would be to avoid any use of public key servers. Host the keys on your own infrastructure and provide them via HTTPS. Furthermore any reference to 32 bit or 64 bit key ids should be avoided.

Update: Some people have pointed out to me that the Debian Wiki contains guidelines for third party repositories that avoid the issues mentioned here.

Update (2020-09-16): While three years old, people still find this blog post when looking for information about Stapling problems. For Apache the situation has improved considerably in the meantime: mod_md, which is part of recent apache releases, comes with a new stapling implementation which you can enable with the setting MDStapling on.

Today the OCSP servers from Let’s Encrypt were offline for a while. This has caused far more trouble than it should have, because in theory we have all the technologies available to handle such an incident. However due to failures in how they are implemented they don’t really work.

We have to understand some background. Encrypted connections using the TLS protocol like HTTPS use certificates. These are essentially cryptographic public keys together with a signed statement from a certificate authority that they belong to a certain host name.

CRL and OCSP – two technologies that don’t work

Certificates can be revoked. That means that for some reason the certificate should no longer be used. A typical scenario is when a certificate owner learns that his servers have been hacked and his private keys stolen. In this case it’s good to avoid that the stolen keys and their corresponding certificates can still be used. Therefore a TLS client like a browser should check that a certificate provided by a server is not revoked.

That’s the theory at least. However the history of certificate revocation is a history of two technologies that don’t really work.

One method are certificate revocation lists (CRLs). It’s quite simple: A certificate authority provides a list of certificates that are revoked. This has an obvious limitation: These lists can grow. Given that a revocation check needs to happen during a connection it’s obvious that this is non-workable in any realistic scenario.

The second method is called OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol). Here a client can query a server about the status of a single certificate and will get a signed answer. This avoids the size problem of CRLs, but it still has a number of problems. Given that connections should be fast it’s quite a high cost for a client to make a connection to an OCSP server during each handshake. It’s also concerning for privacy, as it gives the operator of an OCSP server a lot of information.

However there’s a more severe problem: What happens if an OCSP server is not available? From a security point of view one could say that a certificate that can’t be OCSP-checked should be considered invalid. However OCSP servers are far too unreliable. So practically all clients implement OCSP in soft fail mode (or not at all). Soft fail means that if the OCSP server is not available the certificate is considered valid.

That makes the whole OCSP concept pointless: If an attacker tries to abuse a stolen, revoked certificate he can just block the connection to the OCSP server – and thus a client can’t learn that it’s revoked. Due to this inherent security failure Chrome decided to disable OCSP checking altogether. As a workaround they have something called CRLsets and Mozilla has something similar called OneCRL, which is essentially a big revocation list for important revocations managed by the browser vendor. However this is a weak workaround that doesn’t cover most certificates.

OCSP Stapling and Must Staple to the rescue?

There are two technologies that could fix this: OCSP Stapling and Must-Staple.

OCSP Stapling moves the querying of the OCSP server from the client to the server. The server gets OCSP replies and then sends them within the TLS handshake. This has several advantages: It avoids the latency and privacy implications of OCSP. It also allows surviving short downtimes of OCSP servers, because a TLS server can cache OCSP replies (they’re usually valid for several days).

However it still does not solve the security issue: If an attacker has a stolen, revoked certificate it can be used without Stapling. The browser won’t know about it and will query the OCSP server, this request can again be blocked by the attacker and the browser will accept the certificate.

Therefore an extension for certificates has been introduced that allows us to require Stapling. It’s usually called OCSP Must-Staple and is defined in RFC 7633 (although the RFC doesn’t mention the name Must-Staple, which can cause some confusion). If a browser sees a certificate with this extension that is used without OCSP Stapling it shouldn’t accept it.

So we should be fine. With OCSP Stapling we can avoid the latency and privacy issues of OCSP and we can avoid failing when OCSP servers have short downtimes. With OCSP Must-Staple we fix the security problems. No more soft fail. All good, right?

The OCSP Stapling implementations of Apache and Nginx are broken

Well, here come the implementations. While a lot of protocols use TLS, the most common use case is the web and HTTPS. According to Netcraft statistics by far the biggest share of active sites on the Internet run on Apache (about 46%), followed by Nginx (about 20 %). It’s reasonable to say that if these technologies should provide a solution for revocation they should be usable with the major products in that area. On the server side this is only OCSP Stapling, as OCSP Must Staple only needs to be checked by the client.

What would you expect from a working OCSP Stapling implementation? It should try to avoid a situation where it’s unable to send out a valid OCSP response. Thus roughly what it should do is to fetch a valid OCSP response as soon as possible and cache it until it gets a new one or it expires. It should furthermore try to fetch a new OCSP response long before the old one expires (ideally several days). And it should never throw away a valid response unless it has a newer one. Google developer Ryan Sleevi wrote a detailed description of what a proper OCSP Stapling implementation could look like.

Apache does none of this.

If Apache tries to renew the OCSP response and gets an error from the OCSP server – e. g. because it’s currently malfunctioning – it will throw away the existing, still valid OCSP response and replace it with the error. It will then send out stapled OCSP errors. Which makes zero sense. Firefox will show an error if it sees this. This has been reported in 2014 and is still unfixed.

Now there’s an option in Apache to avoid this behavior: SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors. It’s defaulting to on. If you switch it off you won’t get sane behavior (that is – use the still valid, cached response), instead Apache will disable Stapling for the time it gets errors from the OCSP server. That’s better than sending out errors, but it obviously makes using Must Staple a no go.

It gets even crazier. I have set this option, but this morning I still got complaints that Firefox users were seeing errors. That’s because in this case the OCSP server wasn’t sending out errors, it was completely unavailable. For that situation Apache has a feature that will fake a tryLater error to send out to the client. If you’re wondering how that makes any sense: It doesn’t. The “tryLater” error of OCSP isn’t useful at all in TLS, because you can’t try later during a handshake which only lasts seconds.

This is controlled by another option: SSLStaplingFakeTryLater. However if we read the documentation it says “Only effective if SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors is also enabled.” So if we disabled SSLStapingReturnResponderErrors this shouldn’t matter, right? Well: The documentation is wrong.

There are more problems: Apache doesn’t get the OCSP responses on startup, it only fetches them during the handshake. This causes extra latency on the first connection and increases the risk of hitting a situation where you don’t have a valid OCSP response. Also cached OCSP responses don’t survive server restarts, they’re kept in an in-memory cache.

There’s currently no way to configure Apache to handle OCSP stapling in a reasonable way. Here’s the configuration I use, which will at least make sure that it won’t send out errors and cache the responses a bit longer than it does by default:

SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/var/tmp/ocsp-stapling-cache/cache(128000000)
SSLUseStapling on
SSLStaplingResponderTimeout 2
SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors off
SSLStaplingFakeTryLater off
SSLStaplingStandardCacheTimeout 86400

I’m less familiar with Nginx, but from what I hear it isn’t much better either. According to this blogpost it doesn’t fetch OCSP responses on startup and will send out the first TLS connections without stapling even if it’s enabled. Here’s a blog post that recommends to work around this by connecting to all configured hosts after the server has started.

To summarize: This is all a big mess. Both Apache and Nginx have OCSP Stapling implementations that are essentially broken. As long as you’re using either of those then enabling Must-Staple is a reliable way to shoot yourself in the foot and get into trouble. Don’t enable it if you plan to use Apache or Nginx.

Certificate revocation is broken. It has been broken since the invention of SSL and it’s still broken. OCSP Stapling and OCSP Must-Staple could fix it in theory. But that would require working and stable implementations in the most widely used server products.

Important notice: After I published this text Adam Langley pointed out that a major assumption is wrong: Android 2.2 actually has no problems with SHA256-signed certificates. I checked this myself and in an emulated Android 2.2 instance I was able to connect to a site with a SHA256-signed certificate. I apologize for that error, I trusted the Cloudflare blog post on that. This whole text was written with that assumption in mind, so it's hard to change without rewriting it from scratch. I have marked the parts that are likely to be questioned. Most of it is still true and Android 2 has a problematic TLS stack (no SNI), but the specific claim regarding SHA256-certificates seems wrong.

This week both Cloudflare and Facebook announced that they want to delay the deprecation of certificates signed with the SHA1 algorithm. This spurred some hot debates whether or not this is a good idea – with two seemingly good causes: On the one side people want to improve security, on the other side access to webpages should remain possible for users of old devices, many of them living in poor countries. I want to give some background on the issue and ask why that unfortunate situation happened in the first place, because I think it highlights some of the most important challenges in the TLS space and more generally in IT security.

SHA1 broken since 2005

The SHA1 algorithm is a cryptographic hash algorithm and it has been know for quite some time that its security isn't great. In 2005 the Chinese researcher Wang Xiaoyun published an attack that would allow to create a collision for SHA1. The attack wasn't practically tested, because it is quite expensive to do so, but it was clear that a financially powerful adversary would be able to perform such an attack. A year before the even older hash function MD5 was broken practically, in 2008 this led to a practical attack against the issuance of TLS certificates. In the past years browsers pushed for the deprecation of SHA1 certificates and it was agreed that starting January 2016 no more certificates signed with SHA1 must be issued, instead the stronger algorithm SHA256 should be used. Many felt this was already far too late, given that it's been ten years since we knew that SHA1 is broken.

A few weeks before the SHA1 deadline Cloudflare and Facebook now question this deprecation plan. They have some strong arguments. According to Cloudflare's numbers there is still a significant number of users that use browsers without support for SHA256-certificates. And those users are primarily in relatively poor, repressive or war-ridden countries. The top three on the list are China, Cameroon and Yemen. Their argument, which is hard to argue with, is that cutting of SHA1 support will primarily affect the poorest users.

Cloudflare and Facebook propose a new mechanism to get legacy validated certificates. These certificates should only be issued to site operators that will use a technology to separate users based on their TLS handshake and only show the SHA1 certificate to those that use an older browser. Facebook already published the code to do that, Cloudflare also announced that they will release the code of their implementation. Right now it's still possible to get SHA1 certificates, therefore those companies could just register them now and use them for three years to come. Asking for this legacy validation process indicates that Cloudflare and Facebook don't see this as a short-term workaround, instead they seem to expect that this will be a solution they use for years to come, without any decided end date.

It's a tough question whether or not this is a good idea. But I want to ask a different question: Why do we have this problem in the first place, why is it hard to fix and what can we do to prevent similar things from happening in the future? One thing is remarkable about this problem: It's a software problem. In theory software can be patched and the solution to a software problem is to update the software. So why can't we just provide updates and get rid of these legacy problems?

Windows XP and Android Froyo

According to Cloudflare there are two main reason why so many users can't use sites with SHA256 certificates: Windows XP and old versions of Android (SHA256 support was added in Android 2.3, so this affects mostly Android 2.2 aka Froyo). We all know that Windows XP shouldn't be used any more, that its support has ended in 2014. But that clearly clashes with realities. People continue using old systems and Windows XP is still alive in many countries, especially in China.

But I'm inclined to say that Windows XP is probably the smaller problem here. With Service Pack 3 Windows XP introduced support for SHA256 certificates. By using an alternative browser (Firefox is still supported on Windows XP if you install SP3) it is even possible to have a relatively safe browsing experience. I'm not saying that I recommend it, but given the circumstances advising people how to update their machines and to install an alternative browser can party provide a way to reduce the reliance on broken algorithms.

The Updatability Gap

But the problem with Android is much, much worse, and I think this brings us to probably the biggest problem in IT security we have today. For years one of the most important messages to users in IT security was: Keep your software up to date. But at the same time the industry has created new software ecosystems where very often that just isn't an option.

In the Android case Google says that it's the responsibility of device vendors and carriers to deliver security updates. The dismal reality is that in most cases they just don't do that. But even if device vendors are willing to provide updates it usually only happens for a very short time frame. Google only supports the latest two Android major versions. For them Android 2.2 is ancient history, but for a significant portion of users it is still the operating system they use.

What we have here is a huge gap between the time frame devices get security updates and the time frame users use these devices. And pretty much everything tells us that the vendors in the Internet of Things ignore these problems even more and the updatability gap will become larger. Many became accustomed to the idea that phones get only used for a year, but it's hard to imagine how that's going to work for a fridge. What's worse: Whether you look at phones or other devices, they often actively try to prevent users from replacing the software on their own.

This is a hard problem to tackle, but it's probably the biggest problem IT security is facing in the upcoming years. We need to get a working concept for updates – a concept that matches the real world use of devices.

Substandard TLS implementations

But there's another part of the SHA1 deprecation story. As I wrote above since 2005 it was clear that SHA1 needs to go away. That was three years before Android was even published. But in 2010 Android still wasn't capable of supporting SHA256 certificates. Google has to take a large part of the blame here. While these days they are at the forefront of deploying high quality and up to date TLS stacks, they shipped a substandard and outdated TLS implementation in Android 2. (Another problem is that all Android 2 versions don't support Server Name Indication, a technology that allows to use different certificates for different hosts on one IP address.)

This is not the first such problem we are facing. With the POODLE vulnerability it became clear that the old SSL version 3 is broken beyond repair and it's impossible to use it safely. The only option was to deprecate it. However doing so was painful, because a lot of devices out there didn't support better protocols. The successor protocol TLS 1.0 (SSL/TLS versions are confusing, I know) was released in 1999. But the problem wasn't that people were using devices older than 1999. The problem was that many vendors shipped devices and software that only supported SSLv3 in recent years.

One example was Windows Phone 7. In 2011 this was the operating system on Microsoft's and Nokia's flagship product, the Lumia 800. Its mail client is unable to connect to servers not supporting SSLv3. It is just inexcusable that in 2011 Microsoft shipped a product which only supported a protocol that was deprecated 12 years earlier. It's even more inexcusable that they refused to fix it later, because it only came to light when Windows Phone 7 was already out of support.

The takeaway from this is that sloppiness from the past can bite you many years later. And this is what we're seeing with Android 2.2 now.

But you might think given these experiences this has stopped today. It hasn't. The largest deployer of substandard TLS implementations these days is Apple. Up until recently (before El Capitan) Safari on OS X didn't support any authenticated encryption cipher suites with AES-GCM and relied purely on the CBC block mode. The CBC cipher suites are a hot candidate for the next deprecation plan, because 2013 the Lucky 13 attack has shown that they are really hard to implement safely. The situation for applications other than the browser (Mail etc.) is even worse on Apple devices. They only support the long deprecated TLS 1.0 protocol – and that's still the case on their latest systems.

There is widespread agreement in the TLS and cryptography community that the only really safe way to use TLS these days is TLS 1.2 with a cipher suite using forward secrecy and authenticated encryption (AES-GCM is the only standardized option for that right now, however ChaCha20/Poly1304 will come soon).

Conclusions

For the specific case of the SHA1 deprecation I would propose the following: Cloudflare and Facebook should go ahead with their handshake workaround for the next years, as long as their current certificates are valid. But this time should be used to find solutions. Reach out to those users visiting your sites and try to understand what could be done to fix the situation. For the Windows XP users this is relatively easy – help them updating their machines and preferably install another browser, most likely that'd be Firefox. For Android there is probably no easy solution, but we have some of the largest Internet companies involved here. Please seriously ask the question: Is it possible to retrofit Android 2.2 with a reasonable TLS stack? What ways are there to get that onto the devices? Is it possible to install a browser app with its own TLS stack on at least some of those devices? This probably doesn't work in most cases, because on many cheap phones there just isn't enough space to install large apps. In the long term I hope that the tech community will start tackling the updatability problem.

In the TLS space I think we need to make sure that no more substandard TLS deployments get shipped today. Point out the vendors that do so and pressure them to stop. It wasn't acceptable in 2010 to ship TLS with long-known problems and it isn't acceptable today.

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

tl;dr Dell laptops come preinstalled with a root certificate and a corresponding private key. That completely compromises the security of encrypted HTTPS connections. I've provided an online check, affected users should delete the certificate.

It seems that Dell hasn't learned anything from the Superfish-scandal earlier this year: Laptops from the company come with a preinstalled root certificate that will be accepted by browsers. The private key is also installed on the system and has been published now. Therefore attackers can use Man in the Middle attacks against Dell users to show them manipulated HTTPS webpages or read their encrypted data.

The certificate, which is installed in the system's certificate store under the name "eDellRoot", gets installed by a software called Dell Foundation Services. This software is still available on Dell's webpage. According to the somewhat unclear description from Dell it is used to provide "foundational services facilitating customer serviceability, messaging and support functions".

The private key of this certificate is marked as non-exportable in the Windows certificate store. However this provides no real protection, there are Tools to export such non-exportable certificate keys. A user of the plattform Reddit has posted the Key there.

For users of the affected Laptops this is a severe security risk. Every attacker can use this root certificate to create valid certificates for arbitrary web pages. Even HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) does not protect against such attacks, because browser vendors allow locally installed certificates to override the key pinning protection. This is a compromise in the implementation that allows the operation of so-called TLS interception proxies.

I was made aware of this issue a while ago by Kristof Mattei. We asked Dell for a statement three weeks ago and didn't get any answer.

It is currently unclear which purpose this certificate served. However it seems unliklely that it was placed there deliberately for surveillance purposes. In that case Dell wouldn't have installed the private key on the system.

Affected are only users that use browsers or other applications that use the system's certificate store. Among the common Windows browsers this affects the Internet Explorer, Edge and Chrome. Not affected are Firefox-users, Mozilla's browser has its own certificate store.

Users of Dell laptops can check if they are affected with an online check tool. Affected users should immediately remove the certificate in the Windows certificate manager. The certificate manager can be started by clicking "Start" and typing in "certmgr.msc". The "eDellRoot" certificate can be found under "Trusted Root Certificate Authorities". You also need to remove the file Dell.Foundation.Agent.Plugins.eDell.dll, Dell has now posted an instruction and a removal tool.

This incident is almost identical with the Superfish-incident. Earlier this year it became public that Lenovo had preinstalled a software called Superfish on its Laptops. Superfish intercepts HTTPS-connections to inject ads. It used a root certificate for that and the corresponding private key was part of the software. After that incident several other programs with the same vulnerability were identified, they all used a software module called Komodia. Similar vulnerabilities were found in other software products, for example in Privdog and in the ad blocker Adguard.

This article is mostly a translation of a German article I wrote for Golem.de.

Image source and license: Wistula / Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons by 3.0

Update (2015-11-24): Second Dell root certificate DSDTestProvider

I just found out that there is a second root certificate installed with some Dell software that causes exactly the same issue. It is named DSDTestProvider and comes with a software called Dell System Detect. Unlike the Dell Foundations Services this one does not need a Dell computer to be installed, therefore it was trivial to extract the certificate and the private key. My online test now checks both certificates. This new certificate is not covered by Dell's removal instructions yet.

Dell has issued an official statement on their blog and in the comment section a user mentioned this DSDTestProvider certificate. After googling what DSD might be I quickly found it. There have been concerns about the security of Dell System Detect before, Malwarebytes has an article about it from April mentioning that it was vulnerable to a remote code execution vulnerability.

Update (2015-11-26): Service tag information disclosure

Another unrelated issue on Dell PCs was discovered in a tool called Dell Foundation Services. It allows webpages to read an unique service tag. There's also an online check.

At the recent Chaos Communication Camp I held a talk summarizing the problems with TLS interception or Man-in-the-Middle proxies. This was initially motivated by the occurence of Superfish and my own investigations on Privdog, but I learned in the past month that this is a far bigger problem. I was surprised and somewhat shocked to learn that it seems to be almost a default feature of various security products, especially in the so-called "Enterprise" sector. I hope I have contributed to a discussion about the dangers of these devices and software products.

There is a video recording of the talk avaliable and I'm also sharing the slides (also on Slideshare).

I noticed after the talk that I had a mistake on the slides: When describing Filippo's generic attack on Komodia software I said and wrote SNI (Server Name Indication) on the slides. However the feature that is used here is called SAN (Subject Alt Name). SNI is a feature to have different certificates on one IP, SAN is a feature to have different domain names on one certificate, so they're related and I got confused, sorry for that.

I got a noteworthy comment in the discussion after the talk I also would like to share: These TLS interception proxies by design break client certificate authentication. Client certificates are rarely used, however that's unfortunate, because they are a very useful feature of TLS. This is one more reason to avoid any software that is trying to mess with your TLS connections.

Just wanted to quickly announce two talks I'll give in the upcoming weeks: One at BSidesHN (Hannover, 20th March) about some findings related to PGP and keyservers and one at the Easterhegg (Braunschweig, 4th April) about the current state of TLS.

A look at the PGP ecosystem and its keys

PGP-based e-mail encryption is widely regarded as an important tool to provide confidential and secure communication. The PGP ecosystem consists of the OpenPGP standard, different implementations (mostly GnuPG and the original PGP) and keyservers.

The PGP keyservers operate on an add-only basis. That means keys can only be uploaded and never removed. We can use these keyservers as a tool to investigate potential problems in the cryptography of PGP-implementations. Similar projects regarding TLS and HTTPS have uncovered a large number of issues in the past.

The talk will present a tool to parse the data of PGP keyservers and put them into a database. It will then have a look at potential cryptographic problems. The tools used will be published under a free license after the talk.

Update:
Source code
A look at the PGP ecosystem through the key server data (background paper)
Slides

Some tales from TLS

The TLS protocol is one of the foundations of Internet security. In recent years it's been under attack: Various vulnerabilities, both in the protocol itself and in popular implementations, showed how fragile that foundation is.

On the other hand new features allow to use TLS in a much more secure way these days than ever before. Features like Certificate Transparency and HTTP Public Key Pinning allow us to avoid many of the security pitfals of the Certificate Authority system.

Update: Slides and video available. Bonus: Contains rant about DNSSEC/DANE.

Slides PDF, LaTeX, Slideshare
Video recording, also on Youtube

Yesterday the LibreSSL project released the first portable version that works on Linux. LibreSSL is a fork of OpenSSL and was created by the OpenBSD team in the aftermath of the Heartbleed bug.

Yesterday and today I played around with it on Gentoo Linux. I was able to replace my system's OpenSSL completely with LibreSSL and with few exceptions was able to successfully rebuild all packages using OpenSSL.

After getting this running on my own system I installed it on a test server. The Webpage tlsfun.de runs on that server. The functionality changes are limited, the only thing visible from the outside is the support for the experimental, not yet standardized ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites, which is a nice thing.

A warning ahead: This is experimental, in no way stable or supported and if you try any of this you do it at your own risk. Please report any bugs you have with my overlay to me or leave a comment and don't disturb anyone else (from Gentoo or LibreSSL) with it. If you want to try it, you can get a portage overlay in a subversion repository. You can check it out with this command:
svn co https://svn.hboeck.de/libressl-overlay/
git clone https://github.com/gentoo/libressl.git

This is what I had to do to get things running:

LibreSSL itself

First of all the Gentoo tree contains a lot of packages that directly depend on openssl, so I couldn't just replace that. The correct solution to handle such issues would be to create a virtual package and change all packages depending directly on openssl to depend on the virtual. This is already discussed in the appropriate Gentoo bug, but this would mean patching hundreds of packages so I skipped it and worked around it by leaving a fake openssl package in place that itself depends on libressl.

LibreSSL deprecates some APIs from OpenSSL. The first thing that stopped me was that various programs use the functions RAND_egd() and RAND_egd_bytes(). I didn't know until yesterday what egd is. It stands for Entropy Gathering Daemon and is a tool written in perl meant to replace the functionality of /dev/(u)random on non-Linux-systems. The LibreSSL-developers consider it insecure and after having read what it is I have to agree. However, the removal of those functions causes many packages not to build, upon them wget, python and ruby. My workaround was to add two dummy functions that just return -1, which is the error code if the Entropy Gathering Daemon is not available. So the API still behaves like expected. I also posted the patch upstream, but the LibreSSL devs don't like it. So on the long term it's probably better to fix applications to stop trying to use egd, but for now these dummy functions make it easier for me to build my system.

The second issue popping up was that the libcrypto.so from libressl contains an undefined main() function symbol which causes linking problems with a couple of applications (subversion, xorg-server, hexchat). According to upstream this undefined symbol is intended and most likely these are bugs in the applications having linking problems. However, for now it was easier for me to patch the symbol out instead of fixing all the apps. Like the egd issue on the long term fixing the applications is better.

The third issue was that LibreSSL doesn't ship pkg-config (.pc) files, some apps use them to get the correct compilation flags. I grabbed the ones from openssl and adjusted them accordingly.

OpenSSH

This was the most interesting issue from all of them.

To understand this you have to understand how both LibreSSL and OpenSSH are developed. They are both from OpenBSD and they use some functions that are only available there. To allow them to be built on other systems they release portable versions which ship the missing OpenBSD-only-functions. One of them is arc4random().

Both LibreSSL and OpenSSH ship their compatibility version of arc4random(). The one from OpenSSH calls RAND_bytes(), which is a function from OpenSSL. The RAND_bytes() function from LibreSSL however calls arc4random(). Due to the linking order OpenSSH uses its own arc4random(). So what we have here is a nice recursion. arc4random() and RAND_bytes() try to call each other. The result is a segfault.

I fixed it by using the LibreSSL arc4random.c file for OpenSSH. I had to copy another function called arc4random_stir() from OpenSSH's arc4random.c and the header file thread_private.h. Surprisingly, this seems to work flawlessly.

Net-SSLeay

This package contains the perl bindings for openssl. The problem is a check for the openssl version string that expected the name OpenSSL and a version number with three numbers and a letter (like 1.0.1h). LibreSSL prints the version 2.0. I just hardcoded the OpenSSL version numer, which is not a real fix, but it works for now.

SpamAssassin

SpamAssassin's code for spamc requires SSLv2 functions to be available. SSLv2 is heavily insecure and should not be used at all and therefore the LibreSSL devs have removed all SSLv2 function calls. Luckily, Debian had a patch to remove SSLv2 that I could use.

libesmtp / gwenhywfar

Some DES-related functions (DES is the old Data Encryption Standard) in OpenSSL are available in two forms: With uppercase DES_ and with lowercase des_. I can only guess that the des_ variants are for backwards compatibliity with some very old versions of OpenSSL. According to the docs the DES_ variants should be used. LibreSSL has removed the des_ variants.

For gwenhywfar I wrote a small patch and sent it upstream. For libesmtp all the code was in ntlm. After reading that ntlm is an ancient, proprietary Microsoft authentication protocol I decided that I don't need that anyway so I just added --disable-ntlm to the ebuild.

Dovecot

In Dovecot two issues popped up. LibreSSL removed the SSL Compression functionality (which is good, because since the CRIME attack we know it's not secure). Dovecot's configure script checks for it, but the check doesn't work. It checks for a function that LibreSSL keeps as a stub. For now I just disabled the check in the configure script. The solution is probably to remove all remaining stub functions. The configure script could probably also be changed to work in any case.

The second issue was that the Dovecot code has some #ifdef clauses that check the openssl version number for the ECDH auto functionality that has been added in OpenSSL 1.0.2 beta versions. As the LibreSSL version number 2.0 is higher than 1.0.2 it thinks it is newer and tries to enable it, but the code is not present in LibreSSL. I changed the #ifdefs to check for the actual functionality by checking a constant defined by the ECDH auto code.

Apache httpd

The Apache http compilation complained about a missing ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK. I have no idea what it does, but I found a patch to fix the issue, so I didn't investigate it further.

Further reading:
Someone else tried to get things running on Sabotage Linux.

Update: I've abandoned my own libressl overlay, a LibreSSL overlay by various Gentoo developers is now maintained at GitHub.

I recently held a workshop about cryptography for web developers at the company Internations. I am publishing the slides here.

Part 1: Crypto and Web [PDF] [LaTeX], [Slideshare]
Part 2: How broken is TLS? [PDF] [LaTeX], [Slideshare]
Part 3: Don't do this yourself [PDF] [LaTeX], [Slideshare]
Part 4: Hashing, Tokens, Randomness [PDF] [LaTeX], [Slideshare]
Part 5: Don't believe the Crypto Hype [PDF] [LaTeX] [Slideshare]

Part 2 is the same talk I recently have at the Easterhegg conference about TLS.

A number of people seem to be confused how to correctly install certificate chains for TLS servers. This happens quite often on HTTPS sites and to avoid having to explain things again and again I thought I'd write up something so I can refer to it. A few days ago flattr.com had a missing certificate chain (fixed now after I reported it) and various pages from the Chaos Computer Club have no certificate chain (not the main page, but several subdomains like events.ccc.de and frab.cccv.de). I've tried countless times to tell someone, but the problem persists. Maybe someone in charge will read this and fix it.

Web browsers ship a list of certificate authorities (CAs) that are allowed to issue certificates for HTTPS websites. The whole system is inherently problematic, but right now that's not the point I want to talk about. Most of the time, people don't get their certificate from one of the root CAs but instead from a subordinate CA. Every CA is allowed to have unlimited numbers of sub CAs.

The correct way of delivering a certificate issued by a sub CA is to deliver both the host certificate and the certificate of the sub CA. This is neccesarry so the browser can check the complete chain from the root to the host. For example if you buy your certificate from RapidSSL then the RapidSSL cert is not in the browser. However, the RapidSSL certificate is signed by GeoTrust and that is in your browser. So if your HTTPS website delivers both its own certificate by RapidSSL and the RapidSSL certificate, the browser can validate the whole chain.

However, and here comes the tricky part: If you forget to deliver the chain certificate you often won't notice. The reason is that browsers cache chain certificates. In our example above if a user first visits a website with a certificate from RapidSSL and the correct chain the browser will already know the RapidSSL certificate. If the user then surfs to a page where the chain is missing the browser will still consider the certificate as valid. Such certificates with missing chain have been called transvalid, I think the term was first used by the EFF for their SSL Observatory.

Now the CCC uses certificates from CAcert.org. Two more issues pop up here that make things even more complicated. First of all, the root certificate of CAcert is not in browsers, users have to manually import it. But CAcert offers both their root (Class 1) and sub (Class 3) certificate on the same webpage and doesn't really tell users that they usually only have to import the root. So everyone who imports both certificates will see transvalid CAcert certificates as valid. The second issue that pops up is that browsers sometimes do weird things when it comes to certificate error messages. I have no idea why exactly this is happening, but if you have the CAcert root installed and use Chromium to surf to a page with a transvalid CAcert certificate, it'll warn you about a weak signature algorithm. This doesn't make any sense, I can only assume that it has something to do with the fact that the CAcert root is self-signed with MD5 (which isn't a security issue, because self-signatures don't really have any meaning, they're just there because X.509 doesn't allow certificates without a signature).

So how can you check if you have a transvalid certificate? One way is to use a fresh browser installation without anything cached. If you then surf to a page with a transvalid certificate, you'll get an error message (however, as we've just seen, not neccessarily a meaningful one). An easier way is to use the SSL Test from Qualys. It has a line "Chain issues" and if it shows "None" you're fine. If it shows "Incomplete" then your certificate is most likely transvalid. If it shows anything else you have other things to look after (a common issues is that people unneccesarily send the root certificate, which doesn't cause issues but may make things slower). The Qualys test test will tell you all kinds of other things about your TLS configuration. If it tells you something is insecure you should probably look after that, too.

Last weekend I was at the Easterhegg in Stuttgart, an event organized by the Chaos Computer Club. I had a talk with the title "How broken is TLS?"

This was quite a lucky topic. I submitted the talk back in January, so I had no idea that the Heartbleed bug would turn up and raise the interest that much. However, it also made me rework large parts of the talk, because after Heartbleed I though I had to get a much broader view on the issues. The slides are here as PDF, here as LaTeX and here on Slideshare.

There's also a video recording here (media.ccc.de) and also on Youtube.

I also had a short lightning talk with some thoughs on paperless life, however it's only in German. Slides are here (PDF), here (LaTeX) and here (Slideshare). (It seems there is no video recording, if it appears later I'll add the link.)

tl;dr A very short key exchange crashes Chromium/Chrome. Other browsers accept parameters for a Diffie Hellman key exchange that are completely nonsense. In combination with recently found TLS problems this could be a security risk.

People who tried to access the webpage https://demo.cmrg.net/ recently with a current version of the Chrome browser or its free pendant Chromium have experienced that it causes a crash in the Browser. On Tuesday this was noted on the oss-security mailing list. The news spread quickly and gave this test page some attention. But the page was originally not set up to crash browsers. According to a thread on LWN.net it was set up in November 2013 to test extremely short parameters for a key exchange with Diffie Hellman. Diffie Hellman can be used in the TLS protocol to establish a connection with perfect forward secrecy.

For a key exchange with Diffie Hellman a server needs two parameters, those are transmitted to the client on a connection attempt: A large prime and a so-called generator. The size of the prime defines the security of the algorithm. Usually, primes with 1024 bit are used today, although this is not very secure. Mostly the Apache web server is responsible for this, because before the very latest version 2.4.7 it was not able to use longer primes for key exchanges.

The test page mentioned above tries a connection with 16 bit - extremely short - and it seems it has caught a serious bug in chromium. We had a look how other browsers handle short or nonsense key exchange parameters.

Mozilla Firefox rejects connections with very short primes like 256 bit or shorter, but connections with 512 and 768 bit were possible. This is completely insecure today. When the Chromium crash is prevented with a patch that is available it has the same behavior. Both browsers use the NSS library that blocks connections with very short primes.

The test with the Internet Explorer was a bit difficult because usually the Microsoft browser doesn't support Diffie Hellman key exchanges. It is only possible if the server certificate uses a DSA key with a length of 1024 bit. DSA keys for TLS connections are extremely rare, most certificate authorities only support RSA keys and certificates with 1024 bit usually aren't issued at all today. But we found that CAcert, a free certificate authority that is not included in mainstream browsers, still allows DSA certificates with 1024 bit. The Internet Explorer allowed only connections with primes of 512 bit or larger. Interestingly, Microsoft's browser also rejects connections with 2048 and 4096 bit. So it seems Microsoft doesn't accept too much security. But in practice this is mostly irrelevant, with common RSA certificates the Internet Explorer only allows key exchange with elliptic curves.

Opera is stricter than other browsers with short primes. Connections below 1024 bit produce a warning and the user is asked if he really wants to connect. Other browsers should probably also reject such short primes. There are no legitimate reasons for a key exchange with less than 1024 bit.

The behavior of Safari on MacOS and Konqueror on Linux was interesting. Both browsers accepted almost any kind of nonsense parameters. Very short primes like 17 were accepted. Even with 15 as a "prime" a connection was possible.

No browser checks if the transmitted prime is really a prime. A test connection with 1024 bit which used a prime parameter that was non-prime was possible with all browsers. The reason is probably that testing a prime is not trivial. To test large primes the Miller-Rabin test is used. It doesn't provide a strict mathematical proof for primality, only a very high probability, but in practice this is good enough. A Miller-Rabin test with 1024 bit is very fast, but with 4096 bit it can take seconds on slow CPUs. For a HTTPS connection an often unacceptable delay.

At first it seems that it is irrelevant if browsers accept insecure parameters for a key exchange. Usually this does not happen. The only way this could happen is a malicious server, but that would mean that the server itself is not trustworthy. The transmitted data is not secure anyway in this case because the server could send it to third parties completely unencrypted.

But in connection with client certificates insecure parameters can be a problem. Some days ago a research team found some possibilities for attacks against the TLS protocol. In these attacks a malicious server could pretend to another server that it has the certificate of a user connecting to the malicious server. The authors of this so-called Triple Handshake attack mention one variant that uses insecure Diffie Hellman parameters. Client certificates are rarely used, so in most scenarios this does not matter. The authors suggest that TLS could use standardized parameters for a Diffie Hellman key exchange. Then a server could check quickly if the parameters are known - and would be sure that they are real primes. Future research may show if insecure parameters matter in other scenarios.

The crash problems in Chromium show that in the past software wasn't very well tested with nonsense parameters in cryptographic protocols. Similar tests for other protocols could reveal further problems.

The mentioned tests for browsers are available at the URL https://dh.tlsfun.de/.

This text is mostly a translation of a German article I wrote for the online magazine Golem.de.

Yesterday, we had a meeting at CAcert Berlin where I had a little talk about how to almost-perfectly configure your HTTPS server. Motivation for that was the very nice Qualys SSL Server test, which can remote-check your SSL configuration and tell you a bunch of things about it.

While playing with that, I created a test setup which passes with 100 points in the Qualys test. However, you will hardly be able to access that page, which is mainly due to it's exclusive support for TLS 1.2. All major browsers fail. Someone from the audience told me that the iPhone browser was successfully able to access the page. To safe the reputation of free software, someone else found out that the Midori browser is also capable of accessing it. I've described what I did there on the page itself and you may also read it here via http.

Here are my slides "SSL, X.509, HTTPS - How to configure your HTTPS server" as ODP, as PDF and on Slideshare.

And some links mentioned in the slides:
Check SSL and SSH weak keys due to broken random numbers
EFF SSL Observatory
Sovereign Keys proect

Some great talks on the mentioned topics by others:
Facthacks Talk 29c3
MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA Certificate
Is the SSLiverse a safe place?

Update: As people seem to find these browser issue interesting: It's been pointed out that the iPad Browser also works. Opera with TLS 1.2 enabled seems to work for some people, but not for me (maybe Windows-only). luakit and epiphany also work, but they don't check certificates at all, so that kind of doesn't count.

Die Verteidigung meiner Diplomarbeit über RSA-PSS an der HU Berlin wird am 10. November stattfinden. Die Veranstaltung ist öffentlich (17:00 Uhr s. t., Rudower Chausee 25, Campus Berlin-Adlershof, Raum 3'113). Achtung: Termin und Ort verschoben.

Hier die Ankündigung:

Das Verschlüsselungs- und Signaturverfahren RSA ist das mit Abstand am häufigsten eingesetzte Public Key-Verfahren. RSA kann nicht in seiner ursprünglichen Form eingesetzt werden, da hierbei massive Sicherheitsprobleme auftreten. Zur Vorverarbeitung ist ein sogenanntes Padding notwendig. Bislang wird hierfür meist eine simple Hash-Funktion eingesetzt. Schon 1996 stellten Mihir Bellare und Philipp Rogaway für Signaturen ein verbessertes Verfahren mit dem Namen "Probabilistic Signature Scheme" (PSS) vor. Es garantiert unter bestimmten Annahmen "beweisbare" Sicherheit.

In der Diplomarbeit wurde untersucht, welche Vorteile RSA-PSS gegenüber früheren Verfahren bietet und inwieweit RSA-PSS in verbreiteten Protokollen bereits zum Einsatz kommt. Weiterhin wurde eine Implementierung des Verfahrens für X.509-Zertifikate für die nss-Bibliothek erstellt. nss wird unter anderem von Mozilla Firefox und Google Chrome eingesetzt.

Today I submitted my diploma thesis to my university.

The thesis summarizes several months of investigation of the Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS). Traditionally, RSA signatures are done by hashing and then signing them. PSS is an improved, provable secure scheme to prepare a message before signing. The main focus was to investigate where PSS is implemented and used in real world cryptographic applications with a special focus on X.509.

During my work on that, I also implemented PSS signatures for the nss library in the Google Summer of Code 2010.

The thesis itself (including PDF and latex sources), patches for nss and everything else relevant can be found at
http://rsapss.hboeck.de.