Hanno's blog

In early April I reported security problems with the update process to the security contact of Joomla. While the issue has been fixed in Joomla 3.6, the communication process was far from ideal.

The issue itself is pretty simple: Up until recently Joomla fetched information about its updates over unencrypted and unauthenticated HTTP without any security measures.

The update process works in three steps. First of all the Joomla backend fetches a file list.xml from update.joomla.org that contains information about current versions. If a newer version than the one installed is found then the user gets a button that allows him to update Joomla. The file list.xml references an URL for each version with further information about the update called extension_sts.xml. Interestingly this file is fetched over HTTPS, while - in version 3.5 - the file list.xml is not. However this does not help, as the attacker can already intervene at the first step and serve a malicious list.xml that references whatever he wants. In extension_sts.xml there is a download URL for a zip file that contains the update.

Exploiting this for a Man-in-the-Middle-attacker is trivial: Requests to update.joomla.org need to be redirected to an attacker-controlled host. Then the attacker can place his own list.xml, which will reference his own extension_sts.xml, which will contain a link to a backdoored update. I have created a trivial proof of concept for this (just place that on the HTTP host that update.joomla.org gets redirected to).

I think it should be obvious that software updates are a security sensitive area and need to be protected. Using HTTPS is one way of doing that. Using any kind of cryptographic signature system is another way. Unfortunately it seems common web applications are only slowly learning that. Drupal only switched to HTTPS updates earlier this year. It's probably worth checking other web applications that have integrated update processes if they are secure (Wordpress is secure fwiw).

Now here's how the Joomla developers handled this issue: I contacted Joomla via their webpage on April 6th. Their webpage form didn't have a way to attach files, so I offered them to contact me via email so I could send them the proof of concept. I got a reply to that shortly after asking for it. This was the only communication from their side. Around two months later, on June 14th, I asked about the status of this issue and warned that I would soon publish it if I don't get a reaction. I never got any reply.

In the meantime Joomla had published beta versions of the then upcoming version 3.6. I checked that and noted that they have changed the update url from http://update.joomla.org/ to https://update.joomla.org/. So while they weren't communicating with me it seemed a fix was on its way. I then found that there was a pull request and a Github discussion that started even before I first contacted them. Joomla 3.6 was released recently, therefore the issue is fixed. However the release announcement doesn't mention it.

So all in all I contacted them about a security issue they were already in the process of fixing. The problem itself is therefore solved. But the lack of communication about the issue certainly doesn't cast a good light on Joomla's security process.