The Electronic Frontier Foundation is running a fascinating project called the SSL Observatory. What they basically do is quite simple: They collected all SSL certificates they could get via https (by scanning all possible IPs), put them in a database and made statistics with them.
For an introduction, watch their
talk at the 27C3 - it's worth it. For example, they found a couple of "Extended Validation"-Certificates that clearly violated the rules for extended validation, including one 512-bit EV-certificate.
The great thing is: They provide the full mysql database for download. I took the time to import the thing locally and am now able to run my own queries against it.
Let's show some examples: I'm interested in crypto algorithms used in the wild, so I wanted to know which are used in the wild at all. My query:
SELECT `Signature Algorithm`, count(*) FROM valid_certs GROUP BY `Signature Algorithm` ORDER BY count(*);
shows all signature algorithms used on the certificates.
And the result:
+--------------------------+----------+
| Signature Algorithm | count(*) |
+--------------------------+----------+
| sha512WithRSAEncryption | 1 |
| sha1WithRSA | 1 |
| md2WithRSAEncryption | 4 |
| sha256WithRSAEncryption | 62 |
| md5WithRSAEncryption | 29958 |
| sha1WithRSAEncryption | 1503333 |
+--------------------------+----------+
Nothing very surprising here. Seems nobody is using anything else than RSA. The most popular hash algorithm is SHA-1, followed by MD5. The transition to SHA-256 seems to go very slowly (btw., the most common argument I heared when asking CAs for SHA-256 certificates was that Windows XP before service pack 3 doesn't support that). The four MD2-certificates seem interesting, though even that old, it's still more secure than MD5 and provides a similar security margin as SHA-1, though support for it has been removed from a couple of security libraries some time ago.
This query was only for the valid certs, meaning they were signed by any browser-supported certificate authority. Now I run the same query on the all_certs table, which contains every cert, including expired, self-signed or otherwise invalid ones:
+-------------------------------------------------------+----------+
| Signature Algorithm | count(*) |
+-------------------------------------------------------+----------+
| 1.2.840.113549.27.1.5 | 1 |
| sha1 | 1 |
| dsaEncryption | 1 |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.5849.1.3.2 | 1 |
| md5WithRSAEncryption ANDALSO md5WithRSAEncryption | 1 |
| ecdsa-with-Specified | 1 |
| dsaWithSHA1-old | 2 |
| itu-t ANDALSO itu-t | 2 |
| dsaWithSHA | 3 |
| 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 | 4 |
| ecdsa-with-SHA384 | 5 |
| ecdsa-with-SHA512 | 5 |
| ripemd160WithRSA | 9 |
| md4WithRSAEncryption | 15 |
| sha384WithRSAEncryption | 24 |
| GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 | 25 |
| shaWithRSAEncryption | 50 |
| sha1WithRSAEncryption ANDALSO sha1WithRSAEncryption | 72 |
| rsaEncryption | 86 |
| md2WithRSAEncryption | 120 |
| GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 | 378 |
| sha512WithRSAEncryption | 513 |
| sha256WithRSAEncryption | 2542 |
| dsaWithSHA1 | 2703 |
| sha1WithRSA | 60969 |
| md5WithRSAEncryption | 1354658 |
| sha1WithRSAEncryption | 4196367 |
+-------------------------------------------------------+----------+
It seems quite some people are experimenting with DSA signatures. Interesting are the number of GOST-certificates. GOST was a set of cryptography standards by the former soviet union. Seems the number of people trying to use elliptic curves is really low (compared to the popularity they have and that if anyone cares for SSL performance, they may be a good catch). For the algorithms only showing numbers, 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 is RSASSA-PSS (not detected by current openssl release versions), 1.3.6.1.4.1.5849.1.3.2 is also a GOST-variant (GOST3411withECGOST3410) and 1.2.840.113549.27.1.5 is unknown to google, so it must be something very special.
Ich hatte vor einer Weile schon für das Volksbegehren zur Offenlegung der Berliner Wasserverträge hier geworben.